Americans were admired for their high standard of living, their open society, their comforts, and their technological prowess. Local newspapers reported speed records set by American transcontinental planes and carried news of the latest gadgets, such as portable radios and plastic auto bodies. This new world was associated with economic expansion and money—"Dieu dollar.
American culture was different—it recalled Hollywood, cowboys, and jazz. Above all Americans lived in a modern society: they were "modern people always taking the lead toward progress. If Americans were modern, they also made the French uneasy. Their image cast a shadow. The French in their assessment of America tended, more than other nationalities, to perceive Americans as dominateurs.
But American hegemony haunted the French. If the stereotype of Americans was stable, foreign policy acted as a volatile variable that caused abrupt swings in popular appreciation of the United States while raising the specter of foreign domination. It is not surprising that approval of American foreign policy waned after the enthusiasm of the liberation.
Erosion set in as the French perceived a hardening of American policy into an anti-Communist mold, as East-West tensions grew, as substantive differences between the Allies emerged, and as Washington seemed to interfere in French affairs both at home and abroad. French grievances centered on Washington's advocacy of German recovery, especially rearmament, and its lack of support for the French position in North Africa and Indochina. The danger of American hegemony, however, appeared to be at least as much economic as it was political-military.
From a sample of Frenchmen in who voiced their feelings about the United States, approximately three-quarters expressed positive attitudes: especially sympathy, gratitude, and, somewhat less, admiration. Yet a quarter of the sample which corresponded rather closely to the Communist vote also expressed negative feelings that ranged from apprehension or irritation to antipathy and dislike.
It must be emphasized that eruptions of popular resentment occurred within a context of Gallic friendliness toward the United States, a preference for alliance with the West rather than the East. Of those, for example, who perceived that the superpowers were bent on global domination, almost twice as many attributed this aggressive stance to the Soviets as did to the United States. Fear of Yankee ambitions appeared, however, even in assessments of what the French liked most about Washington's policy—its economic and military aid and its sponsorship of European unification.
In the case of the Marshall Plan, which opinion welcomed without knowing much about it , Gallic skepticism refused to ascribe altruism to the giver. In almost two-thirds of a polling sample attributed the program either to American need for foreign markets or to American desires to intervene in European affairs. French opinion perceived the United States not only as driven to acquire world markets but also as obsessed with fighting communism and ready, a minority thought, to launch a preventive strike against the Soviet Union. Far fewer attributed to American policy a true desire for freedom, peace, or democracy.
What was most unnerving about Washington's policy was that it seemed to endanger peace. It is difficult to overestimate the anxiety about war, especially atomic war, that permeated French consciousness during the Korean War from to The United States, in French eyes, shared responsibility for this tension. A down-to-earth response came from a farmer in the Vaucluse in when agronomists recommended that he plant fruit trees because these were best suited to the soil and climate: "Plant orchards so that the Americans and Russians can use them for a battlefield?
Thanks, not so dumb! At the same time a potential subscriber to Rapports France-Etats-Unis, the mouthpiece for the Marshall Plan, asked the periodical for a public promise to "burn all the subscription lists, letters, and other compromising papers in case the Russians come. Only Communist voters believed, however, that the United States was preparing a war of aggression.
All other voters believed that if any nation were making such preparations, it was the Soviet Union. When the French expressed themselves about their nation's place in the postwar world they blended a passion for independence with realism. A pragmatic assessment of France's position dictated that alliance was the only plausible route to security. The French strongly preferred reliance on the United States over either neutrality or alliance with the Soviet Union.
The optimal stance was a Western alliance that gave more support to French interests in North Africa, for example and also allowed more independence for France. The longing for independence and for nonalignment persisted through the s. At the end of the decade, when asked about preferred "allegiance," only 4 percent of those surveyed looked East and 24 percent looked West while almost 50 percent wanted France to favor neither East nor West. American military bases, like the Atlantic alliance, also aroused mixed feelings. If almost half of those surveyed disapproved of the bases, there was also doubt that their removal would improve national security.
If a majority said the French should adopt a friendly attitude toward the. GIs, over a third preferred a more reserved stance. The town's Communist newspaper publicized the misbehavior of the "occupiers," including the accidents caused by speeding in big cars. Despite the divisions and tensions between the two communities, the natives who were interviewed twenty years later remembered the American base and the soldiers warmly.
The experience of the s also served to sustain the illusion of Americans as happy, young, practical, attractive, and generous. This stereotype was nearly the opposite of the local inhabitants' self-image. They tended to see themselves as old, tired, poor, unattractive, and grasping. In this case we see French perceptions of Americans functioning as an ideal, rather than as a menace, in the internal debate about national identity. Ambivalence, according to the survey, also marked general attitudes about American influence as it did feelings toward NATO and military bases. On the whole the French viewed the United States as a constructive force—but there were risks.
The American presence aided peace, freedom, and socioeconomic progress yet also threatened national independence. America was tolerated. Almost no one wanted American influence increased, and two out of three respondents wanted it diminished. Go Home" graffiti 40 percent disapproved and wanted it removed , 13 percent approved, and 26 percent were indifferent 21 percent had no opinion.
To those who perceived America as a menace it appeared multidimensional, brandishing economic, political, and military weapons.
Delarue - Carnets secrets (Témoignage, document) (French Edition)
But almost none only 4, percent of the participants in this poll perceived America as a cultural threat. Opinion was sharply divided over American films and jazz. This same survey reveals some social and political distinctions among the populace. Rural or urban residence and occupational categories, except for the working class, made little difference. With respect to age groups it was the oldest generation of men and women over 65 who. Those in the youngest category ages 20 to 34 , who found America progressive and more eagerly adopted some American ways such as dress, also showed more apprehension, irritation, and antipathy.
The youngest disliked America's domineering ways and its foreign policy. But youth corresponded strongly with left-wing politics. And by far the most important determinant of attitude was political affiliation.
Seducing the French
The Communist electorate with its working-class base was distinctive in answering questions related to the Soviet Union and to the possibility of war between the superpowers. Only those who identified themselves as Communist voters registered systematic hostility to the United States.
Nevertheless, on certain issues such as the perils of Americanization, the Communists only amplified what others thought. And Gaullist voters, who along with MRP voters displayed the most sympathy and gratitude toward the United States, viewed American influence in Europe as pacific, saw the Marshall Plan as indispensable, and approved American rearmament of France.
Gaullist anti-Americanism was scarcely visible in except for opposition to Washington's sponsorship of European unification. On colonial issues and German rearmament, Gaullists were no more critical of the United States than the moderate parties. They were better informed about the United States and far more favorable toward it than was the general public.
Almost a third had visited America and recalled Fifth Avenue or sunny Florida beaches; they relied on more direct sources of information, such as conversations with Americans. These leaders, unlike the general public, displayed real enthusiasm for borrowing American production techniques. They were also more willing to grant Washington selfless and humane motives. They were more positive about certain aspects of American policy, such as military and economic aid and European unification, while they objected more strenuously than the general public to Washington's policy toward North Africa.
Elites and the public shared the same worry about American hegemony, but the upper stratum expressed even more hostility to any extension of American presence, especially American cultural influence. French men or women, criticized Americans for being immature and uncivilized and disliked the American way of life, for example, its tension and pace. A typical complaint was, "American influence in Europe endangers good taste. At the end of the s the general assessment of the United States was favorable. Approximately 40 percent of those polled held a "very good" or "good" view, 40 percent held "neither a good nor bad" attitude, and some 11 percent professed a "poor" opinion.
The Soviet Union fared much less well. Yet the French continued to divide over allegiance in the Cold War with a handful preferring the Soviets, a quarter the United States, and half wanting to stand outside the blocs. They also opined that in the future the United States would continue to have the highest standard of living but that France was the best place to live. Despite the appeal of the American way, the French way was unsurpassed. The most distinctive feature of French attitudes during the early s was the uneasiness about American domination.
More than other Europeans, the French harbored misgivings about American political, economic, and cultural ambitions—and at the same time welcomed the Western alliance and United States aid. Popular opinion Communist voters apart as a special case shared elite concerns about national independence, disapproved of some of Washington's policies, for example, toward Germany and North Africa, and expressed skepticism about American altruism.
There was a widespread desire for a recovery, if not of prewar status, at least of national independence. A majority nursed the hope of non-alignment between the superpowers and balanced this hope against the reality of need for American protection. Yet another salient feature of opinion was the difference between elite and popular opinion over Americanization. While almost no one wanted American influence increased, the average French men and women made far less than the upper classes did of the danger from either popular culture or consumer products.
The stereotype of Americans and America remained fixed throughout the decade and heavily marked attitudes. Like most collective wisdom about others, the label that identified les grands enfants was pejorative, although it contained strong positive attributes as well. And the Gallic caricature of Americans was in certain respects the mirror image of the. French people's self-image. If Americans were conformists and youthful, then implicitly the French were individualists and mature. Here French identity was defining itself by negatively stereotyping Americans.
But the volatile nature of feelings about America arose from the evolving conjuncture of international relations. In the foreground were the disappointments and quarrels among the Allies and the intermittent explosions of resentment over issues like decolonization. In the background were dependence on the Yankee superpower and the fear of war raised by the Cold War, especially by American anticommunism.
American aid, products, and propaganda did not cap this deep reservoir of political dissatisfaction.
In fact, the presence of United States military bases led to as many unpleasant encounters as to friendships. American economic aid did not earn much gratitude because many saw it as an act of self-interest rather than one of generosity and because it was often invisible. A French worker laboring on a construction project that had been funded and supplied by the Marshall Plan perceived no American gift—only wages for hard work.
American exports to France were not always the finest expressions of American industry and culture. Chewing gum, Hollywood films, and comics did not convey the noblest images of the United States. Furthermore, the entry of American corporations, along with the influx of products, aroused concern about "economic imperialism. American propaganda could not loosen the roots of the left's aversion. It is this source of anti-Americanism that we must take up next.
In the early years of the Cold War America became the subject of heated political and ideological controversy that escalated rhetoric into action and even violence. There was pushing and shoving among deputies in the National Assembly, dock strikes against the transport of American military equipment, a mass demonstration against an American general appointed to head NATO, an effort to oust the editor of Le Monde for his anti-Americanism, and collective pleas from the Parisian intelligentsia to Washington on behalf of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.
Even that most American of consumer products, Coca-Cola, was drawn into the fray. The strident complaints and accusations voiced in this chapter will be those of Communist party members as well as leftist journalists and intellectuals. Ideology and politics form the basis of this encounter with America. Here are the defiant shouts of Communist militants and the confident pronouncements of Parisian mandarins assessing in philosophical and ideological language the meaning of American policy and hegemony in the early s.
The political and intellectual universe of Paris should not, however, be construed simply as anti-American. It was contested territory. The governing coalitions of the Fourth Republic had tied their fortunes to the Atlantic alliance; the French, as we have seen, wanted American protection and liked Americans and much of what America exported. Most visitors to the United States praised the New World's vigor and prosperity, avoided politics, waxed eloquent about "Americanism," or. But on the left it was the anti-Americans who predominated and who captured the most attention.
A "civilization of bathtubs and Frigidaires" is how the Communist poet Louis Aragon described the United States in The party had been forced out of the governing coalition in yet remained the largest party in the National Assembly and commanded roughly 25 percent of the electorate.
Beginning in Communist propaganda savaged every feature of the American presence in France. Washington had supposedly ordered the ouster of the Communists from government in order to make France safe for "Yankee trusts. In the party launched a peace movement to mobilize support against the United States. Utilizing the Stockholm appeal of to ban atomic weapons and appealing to the widespread fear of war between the superpowers, the Mouvement des partisans de la paix organized peace marches and a "peace vote.
One MRP deputy was beaten and the premier's desk was nearly overturned on him. The heavy, polemical barrage that accompanied these actions was crude to the point of being ludicrous. Nevertheless, most of the charges had some basis. The Communists merely distorted programs and motives. A few examples convey the character of this polemic. According to. Writing about such aid, one columnist asked: "Why do they prefer to feed wheat to the pigs and send us corn?
When war came, American planes would drop atomic bombs on the Soviet Union while French troops would fight as infantry alongside a resurrected "Nazi army. With the Korean conflict Communist propaganda reached new heights, or depths, denouncing the United States government and military as "monsters" and "war criminals" and charging the United States army with the use of germ warfare.
Addressing life in the United States, the Communists accused American schools of ignoring European culture and of fearing science because they suspected it of atheism. The daughter of the discoverers of radium remarked that Americans preferred fascism to communism because they thought "fascism has more respect for money. It was usually cool enough in France so that a traditional garde-manger "placed on the window keeps the leftovers of Sunday's lamb until Wednesday.
So many intellectuals aligned themselves with the Communists in the early postwar years that the PCF liked to think of itself as the "parti de l'intelligence. For these compagnons de route the Soviets had proven themselves to be antifascists, and and were twin landmarks in the march of human progress.
Such intellectuals looked with favor at the PCF not because they were captivated by the party's doctrinal eminence but because of its record in the Resistance and its strategic political position. Even if its program was a hodgepodge of Soviet-inspired homilies, the Communist party was the most powerful party on the left. Anti-Americanism appeared in much of their writing.
- Customer reviews;
- Coeliac Disease: What you need to know (Overcoming Common Problems)?
- The Church and the State in France, | SpringerLink?
- Carnets secrets by Jean-Luc Delarue.
- Aïe Aïe Aïe !.
- Her Moonlight Lover (The Edge series).
Daniel Guerin, for example, concluded after visiting the United States that the promise of a new mass society had been betrayed by American labor and checked by the domination of gigantic trusts. A Ford automobile, the civilization of Detroit, the assembly line. Aragon's poetic diatribe revived prewar fears of America as a cultural menace. And by , unlike , the United States was a present danger.
Party speakers railed against the American cultural invasion—sadistic comics and pulp literature. Edgar Morin, a member of the party who later became a prominent sociologist, called the Reader's Digest "a pocket-sized stupefier. With its innocent optimism "You're timid? Cheer up. Here are ways to overcome timidity" Reader's Digest served as a "drug for little minds. War, according to Hollywood, was an adventure; American soldiers were invincible. And English expressions like "toothpaste" and "surplus" were corrupting the integrity of the national language. This cultural colonization was particularly annoying since the United States was "intellectually in the cradle.
What was the purpose of the Communists' polemic? Preventing the integration of France into the Western bloc was its general aim. More specifically, it hoped to subvert the Marshall Plan by arousing resistance, among the working class in particular, and by dampening the generosity of the American Congress. It also sought to damage the reputation of domestic political rivals and prevent them from becoming too cozy with the Americans. Thus it called virtually every non-Communist party or leader in the Fourth Republic from the Socialists to de Gaulle an agent of the United States.
In addition, it mobilized party militants and aroused the electorate. Without question Communist voters most consistently voiced anti-American sentiments. Almost 60 percent of PCF voters thought the United States was readying for an aggressive war and 95 percent disapproved of the presence of American bases in France. But anti-Americanism was not confined to the Communist party or even fellow travelers during the Cold War. It found adherents among left-wing Christian progressistes and so-called neutralists.
And they were often more forgiving and less afraid of the Russians than of the Americans. The overriding issue was to avoid war and define the place of France in the emerging bipolar world. In particular what strategy best guaranteed peace and gave France security and independence? While the Communists seized the Soviet option, Christian progressistes and neutralists tended toward nonalignment in the struggle between East and West.
They hoped to build an independent, unified, and socialist Europe. For these intellectuals Americans were the intruders. The American presence was palpable compared to that of the Russians, whereas the United States itself was remote and virtually unknown in these circles. Some rallied to the Communist-sponsored peace movement, as did, for example, progressive Catholics who wrote for La Quinzaine, a review launched in by the Dominicans that aimed at reviving French Catholicism, especially among the working class. La Quinzaine oscillated between neutralism and an unqualified pro-Soviet stance.
Emmanuel Mounier, who had expressed his distaste for America in the s, wrote to an American friend in The Russians, the Russians for sure. But the Russians are still a long way away. And what we know, what we see are the tons of American paper and American ideas and American propaganda in our bookstores. Our prime ministers must visit the American embassy before making their most important decisions; there is an American shadow over us just as there is a Russian shadow over the other part of Europe.
The Esprit circle found some virtue in the PCF but maintained its autonomy. The brilliant young writer Albert Camus also tried to find a third way between the superpowers even as his outspoken anti-Stalinism earned him notoriety among the community of fellow travelers. Yet Camus, who had been pleased with his visit to the United States in , criticized Americans for their "worship of technology" and the enervating character of American radio and movies.
When Le Monde, which was obligatory reading for the Parisian intelligentsia, adopted a neutralist position on the Cold War, the United States acquired its most formidable critic. The newspaper's position was most succinctly put by one of its columnists, Maurice Duverger:. Between a sovietized Europe and the Atlantic empire, the second solution is clearly preferable because in the first instance slavery would be certain, whereas in the second case war would only become probable. Should circumstance dictate this dilemma we would choose the least terrible alternative.
But since we are not conclusively locked in, a third solution remains: that of a neutralized Europe. He retained the image of American troops retiring from Czechoslovakia in , and leaving Central Europe to the Red Army. He refused to choose between capitalism and communism. Nevertheless, he did not equate the competing ideologies: "It is not a question, whatever one thinks of the dollar, of mass production, and the Reader's Digest, of placing the United States and the Soviet Union on the same footing.
Gilson doubted that Washington would automatically protect France and chose armed neutrality over NATO; it was America's turn to host the next world war. The Catholic philosopher enflamed the debate when, in , he accused Washington of wanting to dump its responsibilities onto Europe. A debate that was ostensibly over neutralist foreign policy escalated into a nasty attack on America when Le Monde published a series of articles on "Imperial America" by Pierre Emmanuel, poet, journalist, and contributor to Esprit.
Emmanuel was one of many leftists to whom American immigration authorities had refused a visa. He ridiculed President Truman as a "former suspenders" salesman" and derided American anticommunism as a sign of panic. He noted that almost every European who had been to the United States was appalled by its social conformity and by the sight of humanity reduced to producers and consumers. A lack of political maturity predisposed Americans to fascism.
The FBI might one day rival the Gestapo. To him, both the United States and the Soviet Union were totalitarian—"the one in power, the other in deed. In the end he could counsel Europeans only to defend their Christian values as the ultimate protection against both totalitarianisms. Europeans would outlast the Americans because they retained an "idea"; "should the new Holy Roman Empire take Washington for its capital, its heart and brains will remain in Europe. Behind the editor's neutralism was a stern Jansenist. At heart the incorruptible editor was a Christian moralist who had a phobia about the corrupting powers of money; he was immune to the charms of America.
A visit to the United States in failed to assuage his misgivings about the American way and only reinforced his worry about America's political ambitions. The American threat remains for the moment less urgent, less serious, and less dangerous than the Soviet menace. Between the invasion of Gletkins and the invasion of Digests, we certainly prefer the latter; however, in the long run the civilization of Digests will kill the European spirit just as surely as the civilization of Gletkins.
French freedoms and independence, they argued, depended on American protection. Aron refused any equivalence between the United States and the Soviet Union drawn by some neutralists and chided them for their leftist dogmatism. He pointed out the American socioeconomic system was far more democratic than that of most European countries. America was, if anything, generous, according to Claudel. If Europeans should take pride in their past, as Emmanuel urged, Claudel suggested they also recognize that Americans had turned toward the future.
It offers more difficulty, more interest, and certainly demands no less virility than appeals to hatred and recourse to the atomic bomb or napalm. But the newspaper's director sparked controversy by also declaring that the NATO pact would inevitably lead to German rearmament. Le Monde 's neutralism had the support of many of its readers and its position was shared by other left-wing journals like Esprit, Les Temps modernes, Franc-Tireur, and France-Observateur.
The latter's formula was "Neither Washington Nor Moscow. In he wrote to an American review advising Americans to "leave us alone.
But the movement failed to find its following and quickly dispersed—in part because of disputes over relations with the United States. Nonalignment might have been a preferred stance for these mandarins but it attracted little support from the public who, while sympathizing with neutralism, preferred the security they had within the Atlantic alliance. The leftist intelligentsia represented by Le Mond e scorned pro-American dissenters. Among the Parisian literati, Preuves was the principal advocate of the United States; the "American review" was what Le Monde dubbed it.
And it received support from the Socialist and the MRP parties. The purpose of Preuves was to detach the intelli-. It engaged in ideological warfare with journals like Esprit and France-Observateur and tried to nullify pressure from the PCF for intellectuals to join the peace movement. While Preuves unmasked Stalinism as a totalitarianism, systematically defended Washington's foreign policy, and praised American institutions, it was not uncritical of the United States. The review, for example, distinguished its anticommunism from that of Senator McCarthy, and it argued that if the Rosenbergs were guilty they should not be executed.
Despite the eminence of its contributors Preuves achieved intellectual respectability only in the late s after the passing of the harshest phase of the Cold War. Its American connection was a handicap. Aversion to the American way, which was acute on the left of the political spectrum, also appeared though to a far lesser extent on the right—even among proponents of Atlanticism.
Delarue - Carnets secrets (Témoignage, document) by Jean-Luc Delarue
This complex stance is not unfamiliar within the tradition of anti-Americanism among French conservatives. In his appeal to the intellectual community in Malraux denied America's cultural claims:. There is no culture in America that claims to be American. That's an invention of Europeans. And American culture, once its European element is removed, is a field of technical knowledge more than it is an organic culture.
Besides America now sets the tone in popular culture, in radio, film, and the press. But the Soviets, unlike the Americans, according to Malraux, wanted to do away with European culture altogether. Menaced both by Americans and by Russians, the Gaullists preferred the protection of the United States, as most of their compatriots did.
Thus the Gaullists were not a major source of anti-Americanism in these years. Malraux, for example, participated in the cultural festival sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. In the Communist party treated the capital to a violent celebration of anti-Americanism. The American general, according to the Communist press, was a "war criminal" and a "microbe general" because of the allegation that he had ordered the use of bacteriological weapons in the Korean War.
He comes dripping with the blood of martyred Korean and Chinese women, children, and old people against whom he has committed crimes of the most unspeakable savagery. He is the war criminal whom history will always call "Ridgway the plague. The Communists intensifed their effort to block the expansion of American "militarism" not only because of the wars in Indochina and Korea, but also because they wanted to obstruct the restoration of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic.
The formula "U. Confrontation with the Communists over General Ridgway grew likely once Antoine Pinay became premier in the spring of Pinay was the most conservative premier the Republic had had since and he was tainted by collaboration with the Vichy regime. As many as twenty thousand demonstrators paraded with placards reading "Ridgway Murderer," "Go Home! Clashes with the security police left one demonstrator dead, two hundred wounded, and several hundred arrested, including party secretary Jacques Duclos.
Those arrested and beaten by the police included two "worker-priests"; these were idealistic young priests who lived and worked among the proletariat in order to bear. At this point the Pinay government became overzealous in its drive to isolate or break the Communist party. As well as violence, ideological hysteria made for comedy—in this case the story of Duclos's pigeons. On the night of 28 May the police stopped Duclos's car near one of the demonstrations and discovered two pigeons in the back seat.
According to the police report, the birds were rolled in a blanket, smothered but still warm. The police concluded they were carrier pigeons that Duclos had used for communications during an illegal demonstration. They arrested the party secretary. Duclos spent a month in jail, though he claimed the fowl were meant for a casserole; others speculated they were part of a flight of "peace doves. The pursuit of Duclos had exceeded Pinay's intentions. Wanting only to discredit the party, the premier intervened to dampen the zeal of the fanatics who had arrested the party leader.
The anti-Communist mania of the Pinay government had unintended consequences. It aroused Jean-Paul Sartre. If forced to choose sides in the Cold War, he preferred the Soviet Union, which he believed represented progress toward human liberation, over the United States, which he deemed a reactionary force. But he was at odds with the PCF. And his views of American society and civilization were nuanced.
Sartre was fascinated with American jazz, film, and literature. He had toured the country twice in —46 trying to fathom its contradictions. He was delighted with America's vigor and the easy relations among social classes. He admired American devotion to freedom and human dignity. Sartre mused on how Americans reconciled conformity with individualism. There is a light crease that runs through the length of the front inside summary flap.
Light rubbing to the dustjacket. Price clipped and re-priced by Heinemman group. Martin's Press The ninth novel in former diplomat Melville's mystery series featuring Superintendent Otani and the Kobe Japan police department this time venturing into the world of high fashion to deal with blackmail greed and murder; boards and text are clean tight square; dustjacket shows creasing and two small tears one in each panel's bottom edge next to the spine some rubbing and shelfwear still whole however with no other tearing or chipping.
First Printing First U. Gumaer, Bookseller]. There is a rub mark on the first free end page from an old penciled in price. Not price clipped but there is not price on the front inside flap. In this case means the book was printed in the UK but bound for Canada or Australia. Severely price clipped and then repriced by the Heinemann Group at 7. On the half title page there is a small ink stain which I believe was an ink transfer from an earlier price sticker.
First American Edition.. Very Good. First American Edition. First U. Darrell R. Illustrations en hors-texte. Dos satisfaisant. Antiqbook RareBookCellar. MareMagnum RareNonFiction. A genoux! Depuis , M. Tout le ciel vert se meurt. Narcisse, ou meurs! A notre demande, M. Cette mesure qui me transporte et que je colore, me garde du vrai et du faux. Ni le doute ne me divise, ni la raison ne me travaille. Nul hasard, — mais une chance extraordinaire se continue. Les vers de M. Daniel de Venancourt sont souples et gracieux.
Les Adolescents. Combien de tendres confidences Ont-ils entendu, — doux secrets! Sa main tremble en tirant le fil de sa quenouille. La chanson des grillons vibre au loin dans la plaine. Je suis la fille du fermier, Qui sanglote dans le sentier! Je ne suis pas le fils du roi, Et je veux causer avec toi! Ton courage est-il abattu? Bergerette, ma mie, ajuste ta cornette! Rassemble tes brebis et prends ta quenouillette! En route! Il habite actuellement Ostende.
En , M. Delagrave, Paris, Souffle, souffle, grand souffle amer,.
- The Poet and The Maestro.
- Les organisations internationales (Science politique) (French Edition);
- Anthologie des poètes français contemporains/Tome troisième!
Chez Paul Ollendorff, Paris. Chez Diodet, Paris. Jamais, on le sait, M. Xavier Privas. Il semble que, moralement aussi bien que physiquement, deux races bataillent en lui. Han Ryner assista, avec MM. Boschot, G. Normandy, Ph. Pagnat et M. La berceuse indolente des eaux ou des bois. Tout aime! Sully Prudhomme E. Etudiant, MM. Rappelons que ce fut M. Dans les jardins, lents et tremblants, Les pauvres vieux tous les soirs viennent. Sur les vieux bancs ils se souviennent, Les pauvres vieux aux cheveux blancs.
Il marcha longtemps. Sous la neige des ans moroses, Tu voudras revivre. Le long du chemin, la jeunesse danse. III Le long du chemin, vieillard, fais ton somme! Ici se rencontrent les. Tout ce qui fut persiste. La Nuit. Comme un vin orgueilleux, plein de rouges prestiges. Ses lourds et sombres yeux, tout de braise et de soie Brillent hideusement lorsque passe une proie. Seul, je me connais. Seul, je sais ce que je suis.
Je me couche, comme un chartreux, dans mon linceul. Je suis les animaux, les plantes et la mer. Depuis, M. La gorge est endormie et sombre encore. Mais soit! Ce soir, ils soupent chez Pluton. La Cithare. Les Tombeaux. Ne grave ni flambeau, ni colombe, ni fleur. Sur les champs nage au loin sa cendre bleue et brune. Le ressac lourd tonnait au bas du promontoire. Le Semeur de Cendres. Le Jardin Secret. Un songe immense et doux de sommeil et de mort… Oh! Alfred Vallette. Graves, nous nous taisons. Voici que les jardins de la nuit vont fleurir. Les lignes, les couleurs, les sons, deviennent vagues.
Il est de clairs matins, de roses se coiffant. Douceur des yeux! Bras tendus au ciel! Grande Nuit! Seule, tu sais calmer les tourments inconnus De ceux que le mentir quotidien torture. Sylvio Lazzari La Chambre blanche lait songer au Kinderscenen de Schumann. On trouve — comme le fait remarquer M. Les larmes sont en nous.
Et les larmes aussi pleurent de nous quitter. Mon enfance, adieu mon enfance. Pas souffert? La Chambre blanche. Botrel est revenu au pays. Dame, oui! Chansons de la Fleur-de-Lys. Il faisait cependant un bien rude tangage! On sombre! Ce serait envoyer vers une mort certaine Cinq hommes pour le moins, cria le capitaine, Et je dois les garder pour le salut commun!
Elle en fait-y des malheureux, des malheureuses! Jamraes, H. Bataille, Ch. Pilon, G. Cazals, etc. Sans doute M. Paul Fort a refondu dans cette nouvelle. Cette fille, elle est morte, est morte dans ses amours. Les dryades craintives se groupent en buissons. Les sylvains, aux coteaux, gagnent les tournants brusques. Leurs cornes ont disparu comme des feux follets. Il tombe! Et les astres bourdonnent sous la ruche des cieux. Roman de Louis XI. Et, en effet, M. Au pays du Bcrry. Les filles filent leurs quenouilles Ou bercent les petits berceaux. Maeterlinck, de M. Adam, etc. Ses premiers vers parurent en , dans La Conque de M.
Pierre Louys. Le Sang parie. Sept heures. Y a-t-il des pardons pour les amours Qui imploreraient un retour? Le Sang parle. Revenu en de Pile Bourbon, M. La nature se tait. Fleurs de Corail. Le Verbe surprit Rome en sa luxure immonde. Pourquoi laisser encor vos muses endormies? Marseille, En Passant. Pourtant vous laissez les jaloux Ravir quelque chose de vous A chaque mot cruel ou doux Que vous leur dites.
Je suis triste tout simplement. Dans la cour une voix ravie Chante un refrain toujours pareil Sur la route toujours suivie. Mon mal est fini comme un drame.