The difficulty is that electronic media is so ubiquitous; it would be difficult to design a study as Phillips did when we only had to contend with local print media. Regarding the type of violence known as interpersonal violence, we understand this type is responsible for most violence. Furthermore, although different cultural, racial, and ethnic groups have different rates of different types of violence e.
Because the number of domestic violence shelters increased dramatically, reducing the number of battered African. American women who turned to committing violence against their partner as a means to stop being battered. One form of violence that has not been studied adequately is violence by organically brain-damaged individuals Bell et al. Although there is no evidence for the reason for this lack of study, it can be hypothesized that the major reason for this oversight is the marginalization of those afflicted with head injury that ultimately results in their explosive behavior.
The issue of legitimate versus illegitimate violence is another issue we must explore. As director of the Institute of Juvenile Research, where child psychiatry began and where the issue of family and community violence was addressed more than years ago, I am aware of a great deal of relevant history that pertains to contagion, group marginalization, and resilience or protective factors as they relate to violence. The lessons learned from this history are quite instructive to this discussion. In Chicago in , the Great Fire created a lot of instability in a city with a population that was 70 percent either foreign-born or first-generation.
The results were families who, due to being disrupted by poverty and unfamiliar community circumstances as result of immigration, were unable to provide stable family environments and to flourish. Evidence of this problem was the extraordinarily high rate of European immigrant domestic violence in Chicago from to Adler, Later, IJR researchers Shaw and McKay noted delinquency was less due to biological, ethnic, or cultural factors and more due to social disruption eroding formal and informal social control in specific transitional neighborhoods delinquency areas in a city.
Fifty years ago, the science was not as advanced as it is now. Of course, this finding predated by 50 years the seminal research of Sampson et al. Another example of how protective factors cultivate resiliency, which in turn is protective against contagion of violence, specifically cluster or copycat suicide, is found in building protective factors around vulnerable populations of potentially suicidal individuals.
Accordingly, because youth engage in multiple risky behaviors due to their immature brain development, we have likened adolescents to be like cars with just gasoline, but no brakes and steering wheels, that is, community or social fabric Bell and McBride, b. These protective factors can be cultivated Bell, and have been proposed as a strategy of suicide prevention. Research has indicated that children who are sexually and physically abused are more likely to engage in suicidal behavior compared to children who are not abused IOM, However, children with protective factors in their lives have fewer traumatic stress drivers of suicidal and other-directed violent behavior than children without these protective factors Griffin et al.
Thus, it is possible to cultivate resiliency in these populations as well. Finally, based on years of public health research and work, the Seven Field Principles for Health Behavior Change are appropriate universal guiding principles to infuse protective factors in populations at risk for. Patrick Burton, Ph.
Crime is one of the most significant challenges facing democratic South Africa, and young people between the ages of 12 and 21 are often at the receiving end of this escalating violence. Figures show that young people experience violence at rates that are exponentially higher than their adult counterparts Leoschut and Burton, Given that this age cohort constitutes a significant proportion of the general population of South Africa, any efforts to reduce and prevent violence should incorporate components addressing child and youth violence.
Furthermore, substantial evidence shows that violence and victimization against young people is closely correlated to later violence; any attempt to adequately address violence at a community or societal level must therefore take into account the levels and nature of violence experienced by young people and children. Schools in South Africa are consistently shown to be one of the most common sites of violence perpetrated against children and youth.
This is not surprising because children spend most of their time away from home in the school environment. These feelings of apprehension were most frequently attributed to the fear of criminals Fear was not limited to the school environment, but was. Saving children from a life of crime. Stress, risk, and resilience in children and adolescents: Processes, mechanisms and interventions.
Why do school order and safety matter? Educational Researcher 39 In addition to undermining their sense of safety and security, creating feelings of fear and anxiety, disrupting eating and sleeping patterns, and leading to difficulties concentrating at school, direct and indirect exposure to violence can result in the adoption of violence as a legitimate means of resolving conflicts and as a way of protecting oneself from harm Boxford, All of these factors make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for quality learning to occur and have thus been found to contribute to grade repetition and the non-completion of schooling.
This suggests that the vast majority of children and youth in South Africa are deprived of their right to live and learn in a safe environment that is free of violence or its threat. This paper will provide insights into just one approach to addressing school violence in South Africa, and into some of the lessons learned as the program has evolved and adapted based on several evaluations.
The departure point for the toolkit recognizes that violence has physical, social, psychological, and environmental roots, and that, to end it, we need to address it at multiple levels and from different sectors of society. The complex and dynamic interactions of all the environments e. Another point needs to be emphasized at the outset.
Rather, these are isolated, high-profile, and sensationalized incidents, and while tragic, are not where the problem lies. Rather, the real problem lies in the apparently minor, but repetitive, acts of violence. These acts lead to the most frequent negative consequences of violence in schools: dropping out, truancy, school and often social phobia, depression, and lack of self-confidence in students. These acts can also negatively affect educational outcomes and attachment to schools and learning, which we. This approach posits that the responsibility for and successful approach to school safety requires the commitment of all those who constitute the schooling environment: learners, educators, principals, parents, and the school governance structures.
It also advocates that a safe school needs to be first and foremost a functional school. In short, the more effectively and democratically a school is managed, generally, the higher the likelihood of a positive impact on safety outcomes Gottfredson, The approach provides the basis for the South African School Safety Policy that is being developed; details the implementation of standardized school policies regarding learner and educator conduct, rights, responsibilities, and expectations; and requires buy-in from principals, learners, educators, school safety teams, and school governing bodies.
The toolkit acknowledges that each school is at a different point in its journey toward school safety and that available resources and capacity differ from school to school. The toolkit thus allows for the least resourced school to find an appropriate entry point into the system as well as the most-resourced school. The toolkit is built on a foundation composed of four building blocks: Be prepared to prevent and manage problems and violence; be aware of what is happening at school; take action when something happens; and finally, take steps to build a caring school.
Each building block assists the school to work systematically toward achieving school safety. These effectively constitute a process of diagnosing, planning, acting, and monitoring. Most importantly, such an approach is designed to improve school management rather than the range of additional activities and interventions that may be offered. It does not serve to replace, for example, life skills, conflict mediation, positive discipline, or after-school care activities that may be implemented at the school level. Although the implementation of the toolkit in some instances resulted in decreases in school incidents by up to 23 percent when controlled for external variables , there were also sufficient examples of a whole-school approach failing to adequately address violence issues in schools to warrant further exploration into what works and what does not, particularly as within South Africa, where the approach was to be scaled up from the original 85 pilot sites to more than 2, schools nationally.
This assessment of what was impacting the success and failure of the toolkit has increasingly been done through the application of a public health lens, together with a greater recognition placed on the interactions among different environments in which, on individual and community levels, learners and educators live, and on an institutional level, the school is situated. This reflects findings into the efficacy of school-specific interventions to reduce violence, which show that comprehensive school-based interventions achieve greater and more sustained impact than single interventions.
The approach thus requires that the school-based intervention is embedded in what is happening in the homes of children, and the communities in which the school is situated. This reflects the findings of the report on school violence released by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children, which argues that community outreach i. Accordingly, a revised model of Hlayiseka was piloted in a number of sites in urban environments throughout South Africa, and paired with different family and community-based interventions, determined through a process of site-based safety auditing.
Three particular family-based interventions were prioritized in the different sites: healthy masculinities for fathers, and young fathers in particular; family role modeling; and parenting interventions. These were introduced in a phased manner, and resulted in further reductions of up to 18 percent in levels of violence within each of the targeted schools. Other indirect impact was reported by school principals, primarily in the form of improved educational performance in class tests and examinations.
However, the degree to which the improved impact is a direct measure of the additional family-directed interventions, or the effect of a longer implementation period of the toolkit at each school, has not been measured. Bevin, D. Espelage, W. Kingsbury, J. Peugh, and A. A socioecological model for bullying prevention and intervention in early adolescence: An exploratory examination. Jumerson and M. Furlong, Eds. A number of challenges have been documented through the evaluation process that impact the potential of the toolkit to successfully interrupt violence at and relating to the school.
These arise particularly from the need to embed the interaction and intervention in the broader environments:. The consecutive addressing of protective factors outside the control of the school, and parents or caregivers. The greatest impact is seen when interventions specifically targeting school safety occur concurrently with tailored family and community interventions. Ownership is key, particularly in environments where effective and efficient school managers are scarce.
The most effective usually serve as project champion and are usually also those who are moved on in relatively quick succession to where the need for effective leadership is seen as greatest. This often leaves an ownership vacuum, with particular approaches or interventions seen as being the property of an individual; hence there is no institutionalization of the approach. Accountability from the school level up to districts, provinces, and national levels. Most often, accountability, where it exists at all, stops at a district or provincial level. School principals are often faced with the same challenge as police station commanders—whereas increased reports of violence may initially signal an increase in reporting and trust and action, rather than an actual increase in the levels of crime.
Furthermore, competition among districts and provinces results in data not being fed up the chain to national levels, which results in an inaccurate picture, if any picture at all. Furthermore, an ongoing debate as to the core business of the school, and the Department of Basic Education, which sees learning as its core business, rather than enhancing the safety of the school. Safety is perceived by many to still be a police or parental function. Not unrelated to this is the blame-laying game, where educators shift the blame for violent behavior to parents, and vice versa—often resulting in a lack of engagement between the two and a lack of willingness to engage.
Eric F. Dubow, Ph. Wars, ethnopolitical violence, and state-perpetrated violence are prevalent throughout the world, and a risk for such violence exists in many countries. Once political instability results in violence, however, the consequences for children in the affected countries become even worse as violence begets more violence. In this paper, I focus on how exposure to ethnopolitical violence infects the community, the family, and the individual child with violence. I also describe evidence about some specific psychological processes accounting for how observed war violence leads the child to become more aggressive and violent.
Significant evidence shows that war affects community-level indicators of violence. Archer and Gartner , reviewed studies showing that wars were related to subsequent postwar crimes in the community. The authors examined homicide rates in combatant and noncombatant comparison nations in World Wars I and II—homicide rates 5 years before and 5 years after war.
In combatant nations, homicide rates increased in HD; L. Rowell Huesmann, Principal Investigator. Archer and Gartner noted that previous research in this area attributed effects of war on subsequent community-level crime to factors such as loosening of family ties and weakened respect for law, human life, and property. The authors examined several factors that could account for war effects on subsequent homicides, including whether the country won or lost the war and subsequent economic effects, and none of these factors accounted for the significant effects. Archer and Gartner argued that the effects were likely due to a legitimation hypothesis that stipulates that sanctioning of killing interculturally during times of war normalizes and legitimizes killing and other acts of violence intraculturally.
Landau found that during a year period in Israel, a monthly increase in security-related casualties predicted the number of homicides Landau and Pfeffermann, ; Landau, , This relation extended months ahead. Landau also examined crime statistics comparing and the year before and the year after the onset of Second Intifada : homicide rates increased 28 percent, robbery 11 percent, and road accident fatalities 16 percent.
Landau and Pfeffermann , p. In other words, there is a gradual, consistent, and continuous process of erosion of basic social norms regarding violence in society. As another example of war violence affecting a community-level indicator of violence, Miguel et al. The relationship was significant even when controlling for player positions, income, age, and league and team fixed effects.
Researchers also have reported that war violence and family-level violence co-occur. Landau found that during the First Intifada, there was a significant increase in domestic homicides in Israel. Similarly, Clark et al. Catani et al. More than half witnessed three or more family violence events e.
A fair amount of literature has been published recently on the damaging psychosocial effects of war on youth in Iraq, Palestine, Israel, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Northern Ireland. Studies most commonly focus on posttraumatic stress. Only 12 of 95 studies of adolescents exposed to war violence published between and examined effects on problem behavior, Barber reported.
In our own 3-year longitudinal study of 1, Israeli and Palestinian 8-, , and year-olds Dubow et al. Political violence exposure predicted increases in violence at more proximal levels of the social ecology e. A body of literature is also emerging on outcomes for child soldiers. Much of the research examines child soldiers in Sierra Leone and Uganda once they become reintegrated into their communities. In Sierra Leone, Betancourt et al. However, most of the associations between war exposure and subsequent outcomes were no longer significant once postconflict experiences were included in statistical models.
Specifically, that study and other studies in Sierra Leone and Uganda Annan et al. Family and community acceptance upon reintegration, literacy, and economic opportunities helped shape resilient outcomes. Empirical research has identified a few psychological processes that appear to promote the contagion of violence. First, consistent with the legitimation-habituation hypothesis, exposure to violence seems to promote social cognitions that support and justify aggression Huesmann and Kirwil, Observing violence promotes an aggressive way of thinking that includes fantasizing about aggression, normative beliefs that aggression is a justified response to solving social conflicts, and internalized scripts guidelines for social behavior for how to behave aggressively in social conflict situations.
In our study of Israeli and Palestinian youth Dubow et al. In addition, Cummings et al. In a 3-year longitudinal study of to year-olds in Northern Ireland, the authors found that sectarian violence affected problems at the family level i. War and ethnopolitical violence are contagious: exposure to it stimulates violent behavior both in those who are victimized by it and in those who observe it.
Based on the contagion of violence across ecological. In addition, some have proposed approaches to preventing collective violence in the first place Krug et al. Madelyn S. Gould, Ph. Lake, M. New York State Psychiatric Institute. This evidence is derived from three bodies of research: studies of the impact of media reporting on suicide, studies of suicide clusters, and studies of the impact on adolescents of exposure to a suicidal peer.
In each case, suicide contagion can be viewed within the larger context of behavioral contagion or social learning theory. While research has also addressed the distinct but related topic of the contagion of nonsuicidal self-injurious behavior Jacobson and Gould, ; Hawton et al. Research into the impact of media stories about suicide has demonstrated an increase in suicide rates after both nonfictional and fictional stories about suicide.
Most research in this area has addressed nonfictional reporting, which has been shown to have a more powerful effect Stack, More than 50 studies on nonfictional stories reported in newspapers, on television, and more recently on the Internet, have yielded consistent findings. Suicide rates go up following an increase in the frequency of. Moreover, suicide rates go down following a decrease in the frequency of stories about suicide e. A dose-response relationship between the quantity of reporting on completed suicide and subsequent suicide rates has consistently been demonstrated e.
Changes in suicide rates following media reports are more pronounced in regions where a higher proportion of the population is exposed Etzersdorfer et al. The prevalence of Internet users, with access to Internet stories about suicide, has been associated with general population suicide rates in males, but not females Hagihara et al. The way suicide is reported is a significant factor in media-related suicide contagion, with more dramatic headlines and more prominently placed i. Repetitive reporting on the same suicide and definitive labeling of the death as a suicide have also been associated with greater increases in subsequent suicide rates Niederkrotenthaler et al.
Content analyses of suicide newspaper reports from six countries with different suicide rates Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, and the United States found that attitudes toward suicide in newspaper reports varied by country, and that national suicide rates were higher in countries where media attitudes toward suicide were more accepting Hungary and suicide completers were more positively portrayed Japan Fekete et al. Conversely, national suicide rates were lower in countries Finland, Germany, and the United States where reporting tended to portray the suicide victim and act of suicide in terms of psychopathology and abnormality, and to describe the negative consequences of the suicide.
Moreover, media stories about individuals with suicidal ideation who used adaptive coping strategies to handle adverse events and did not attempt suicide have been negatively associated with subsequent suicide rates Niederkrotenthaler et al. The impact of media reporting on subsequent suicides is not monolithic, but interacts with characteristics of the reported suicide and characteristics of the media audience, as well as with characteristics of the media portrayal, as noted above. For example, celebrity suicides are more likely and the suicides of criminals are less likely to be followed by increased suicide rates Stack, ; Niederkrotenthaler et al.
A handful of extant individual-level studies, however, have examined whether individuals who attempted suicide following a media story were exposed to and influenced by the media report, and have contributed evidence to support the specificity of the media effect. Hawton and colleagues conducted a study in emergency departments in the United Kingdom, examining the pattern of suicide attempts before and after a fictional Royal Air Force pilot took an overdose of paracetamol i.
Presentations for self-poisoning increased by 17 percent in the week after the broadcast and 9 percent in the second week. Increases in overdoses using the specific drug used by the model were more marked than increases in other types of overdoses. The most compelling evidence of modeling from this study was that use of the specific drug for overdose among overdose patients who were viewers of the drama doubled after the episode in question, compared with overdose patients who were viewers of the drama prior to that episode. Twenty percent of the interviewed patients reported that the model had influenced their behavior.
In a more recent study, 63 individuals who attempted suicide in Taipei, Taiwan, following the suicide of a young female pop singer were assessed for exposure to media reporting about her death. Forty-three 68 percent respondents had been exposed to the media reporting, of whom 37 percent reported that the media stories influenced their suicide attempts Chen et al. This study also demonstrated a positive modeling effect on the chosen method of suicide burning charcoal inside a closed car , with an adjusted odds ratio of for additional evidence of a modeling effect based on choice of suicide method, see also Etzersdorfer et al.
Clusters occur primarily among teenagers and young adults, with between 1 percent and 5 percent of teen suicides occurring in clusters Gould, ; Gould et al. A case-control study of two teen suicide clusters in Texas indicated that the clusters included teens who had close personal relationships with others in the cluster, as well as teens from the same community who were not directly acquainted with one another Davidson et al.
When compared with matched living controls, suicide completers were more likely to have preexisting vulnerabilities e. It has been suggested that teen suicide clusters may result from the combination of assortative relating, the tendency for similar individuals in this case, teens at high risk of suicide to preferentially associate with one another, with shared life stress Joiner, According to this argument, which should apply only to those teens within a suicide cluster who were directly acquainted with one another, teen suicides may cluster within a peer group because of high levels of preexisting vulnerability across the peer group, not because of suicide contagion.
A recent study used agent-based computer simulation modeling to test this hypothesis and to explore the possible mechanisms behind suicide clustering Mesoudi, As programmed in the simulation model, social learning was sufficient to generate suicide clusters localized both in time and space. The simulation model further found that assortative relating, also known as homophily, was likely to generate spatially localized suicide clusters among high-risk peer groups, but less likely to generate spatiotemporal suicide clusters and unlikely to generate purely temporal clustering of suicides.
Finally, the model confirmed that media effects, in combination with the effects of prestige and similarity biases, were capable of generating suicide clusters localized in time, but not space. Even within spatiotemporal suicide clusters, where decedents are more likely to have direct contact with one another, media reporting on suicide can play a role. A recent analysis of the Foxconn suicides in China found support for a temporal clustering effect Cheng et al. National but not local newspaper reporting on the suicides and the occurrence of a Foxconn suicide or suicide attempt were each associated with elevated chances of a subsequent suicide 3 days later, demonstrating the impact of both media-related contagion and direct contagion within the Foxconn company.
Of 16 studies reviewed by Insel and Gould on the impact on adolescents of exposure to a suicidal peer, the majority found a significant association between exposure to the suicidal behavior of an adolescent peer and a subsequent adolescent suicide attempt. Odds ratios ranged from 2. Analysis of data on a nationally representative sample of U. Girls were more likely to attempt suicide if they knew someone who had survived a suicide attempt, while boys were more likely to attempt suicide if they knew someone who.
Teens who had not made a suicide attempt in wave one of the study were more likely to have attempted suicide in wave two if they knew someone who had attempted suicide in the interim; this temporal sequencing lends support for the role of contagion alongside the possible effect of assortative relationships among high-risk teens. In the context of exposure to the suicidal behavior of an intimate, contagion may operate via the impact on a vulnerable teen of stress or grief at the loss of a loved one, as well as via social learning about suicide.
A number of evidence-based interventions capable of combating suicide contagion have been developed. Studies have shown that it is possible to intervene to mitigate media-driven suicide contagion by implementing media guidelines for suicide reporting Gould, ; Pirkis and Nordentoft, Media guidelines can interrupt the transmission of suicidality by identifying the types of media reporting through which suicidality is likely to be transmitted, and by modifying the volume and content of media reporting, with resultant decreases in suicide rates.
For example, suicides in the Vienna subway system decreased by approximately 75 percent in following implementation of media guidelines for reporting on subway system suicides Etzersdorfer et al. Applying media guidelines to new electronic media, including social networking websites, presents a new challenge to the suicide prevention community Pirkis and Nordentoft, ; Robertson et al. Screening for suicide risk can also interrupt the transmission of suicidality by identifying in advance individuals who may be susceptible to suicide contagion Gould et al.
In addition, suicide screening works to alleviate that susceptibility by enabling services to be directed to at-risk individuals identified by the screen. Key settings for suicide screening include schools and primary care practices. A range of school- and community-based psychosocial programs may also work to alleviate susceptibility to suicide contagion by, for example, changing adolescent peer norms through positive messaging Wyman et al. While the complex etiology of suicidal behavior is recognized Gould et al. Strategies to prevent suicide contagion are essential and require ongoing evaluation.
Marco Iacoboni, M. The social sciences have documented the contagion of violence with carefully controlled studies, including longitudinal studies over long periods of time. Indeed, some have proposed for the contagion of violence a model that mimics the spreading of infectious diseases for both these issues, see other contributors to this workshop summary.
This model captures well the phenomenon of contagion associated with violent behavior. The model, however, does not provide a biological mechanism that can plausibly account for the spreading of the behavior. Infectious diseases such as the flu have well-defined and well-studied causes, that is, the viruses that spread the flu from individual to individual.
The missing link between the compelling social science studies on contagion of violence and the model of such contagion as an infectious disease is a biologically grounded mechanism. A recent neuroscience discovery, a type of brain cell called mirror neuron, may provide such a missing link. This paper summarizes what we know and do not know yet about mirror neurons and discusses the empirical findings from the neuroscience labs in light of potential implications for policy regarding the contagion of violence and its control. Mirror neurons were reported for the first time in the scientific literature exactly 20 years ago Dipellegrino et al.
The scientists who discovered mirror neurons were investigating a region of the monkey brain that controls actions with the hand e. All of these actions are essential for. The scientists were studying the responses of the neurons, while the monkeys were performing those actions, to better understand how the brain controls motor behavior. Unexpectedly, the scientists found that some of the neurons were activated not only when the monkey was performing the action, but also when the monkey was simply observing somebody else making the same action.
For instance, some grasping neurons activate when the monkey grasps a tiny object like a raisin this type of grasp is called precision grip and is performed with the thumb and the index finger , but do not activate when the monkey grasps a large object like a banana this type of grasp is called whole-hand prehension and requires the use of all fingers and the palm, too. Among these grasping neurons for precision grip, there were some that activated when the monkey did not move at all, but simply watched somebody else grasping a tiny object not necessarily a raisin, but any kind of tiny object with a precision grip.
The activity of these cells nearly suggested that while watching other people busy with their own activities, the monkey appeared to be seeing her own actions reflected by a mirror. Hence, the scientists decided to call these brain cells mirror neurons Gallese et al. The early studies on mirror neurons focused on the brain region in which these cells were originally discovered.
These early studies demonstrated that there are two main classes of mirror neurons. While approximately one-third of mirror neurons activated for exactly the same action, whether performed or observed these are called strictly congruent mirror neurons , about two-thirds of mirror neurons also fired for other kinds of observed actions these are called broadly congruent mirror neurons Gallese et al.
These neurons would activate as long as the observed action achieved the same goal of the performed action. This property suggests that these cells implement a fairly sophisticated mapping of the perceived actions of other people onto the motor repertoire of the perceiver. But how sophisticated is this mapping?
Studies have shown that mirror neurons can activate for observed actions that are not completely in sight that is, vision is partially occluded Umilta et al. The most compelling of these studies demonstrate that the majority of mirror neurons do not even code the action itself e. This seems a wonderfully efficient mechanism for imitation, which is a fundamental behavior for learning and transmission of culture, and possibly for empathy. However, the mirror mechanism in the brain also suggests that we are automatically influenced by what we.
While the early studies on mirror neurons focused on hand and mouth actions, more recent studies have demonstrated the existence of mirror neurons for other kinds of actions or specific aspects of the observed action and most importantly in many brain regions. This new wave of studies suggests that the neural mirror mechanism is rather diffuse and pervasive. In monkeys, three different labs have reported mirror neurons for reaching movements in two different brain areas Cisek and Kalaska, ; Pfeifer et al. Mirror neurons have also been reported for eye movements Shepherd et al.
The neurons that code for eye movements tend to have a preferred direction. That is, some neurons activate for eye movements toward a specific sector of space, but not others. Mirror neurons for eye movements do the same. When the monkey is simply watching another monkey looking in the preferred direction of the neuron, the neuron activates as if the monkey was moving the eyes toward that direction. This mirroring mechanism may be important for gaze following and joint attention, two foundational behaviors for the development of social cognition.
Single-cell recordings require invasive brain surgical procedures and are obviously performed in experimental animals, but not in human subjects volunteering for research experiments. However, in some rather exceptional situations, it is possible to piggy-back on existing medical procedures to obtain recordings of individual cells in the human brain. A recent study indeed was able to do so Mukamel et al.
The subjects of the study were patients with epilepsy who did not respond well to medications. In these situations, it is appropriate to treat epilepsy with brain surgery, in which the neurosurgeon removes the pathological brain tissue and spares the healthy tissue. To determine the epileptic focus or foci, the surgeon implants depth electrodes into the brain.
While in the hospital, the patient stops taking medications and eventually seizes, thus allowing the electrodes implanted in the depth of the brain to show the surgeon exactly where the pathological brain tissue is. Typically, this procedure only requires the registration of the electroencephalograph EEG signal that allows the surgeon to localize the affected tissue. However, with a slight modification of the electrodes used for this procedure, it is also possible to record the activity of individual neurons from the brain of patients. A recent study that recorded for the first time individual mirror neurons in humans reported mirror neurons in two areas that were previously not known to have these kinds of brain cells Mukamel et al.
Note that the location of the electrodes in the study on neurosurgical patients is exclusively dictated by medical considerations, not by research questions. Thus, the study in human neurosurgical patients did not record at all from brain areas in which mirror neurons were found in the monkey brain. The two areas in which mirror neurons in humans were found are known to be important for initiating action and for memory. Mirror neurons in a brain region known to be important for memory suggest that we mirror the actions of others in a rather rich fashion.
That is, when I watch somebody else grasping a cup of coffee, my brain not only mirrors the motor plans to perform the same action, but also retrieves memory traces of my previous grasping actions. However, it also makes us more prone to imitate what we see, thus facilitating social contagion.
So far we have discussed data from single-cell recordings in monkeys and, in one study, in humans. These data are probably the most compelling data one can obtain in neuroscience. However, single-cell recordings require invasive brain surgery, and their use in humans is obviously extremely limited. There is a large body of scientific literature on the study of mirror neurons in humans that uses noninvasive forms of brain investigation. The four main techniques used are functional magnetic resonance imaging Iacoboni et al. Although the data obtained with these techniques are not as compelling as the data obtained with single-cell recordings, they are still extremely valuable.
These techniques make it possible to study healthy subjects and neuropsychiatric patients, and to correlate the activity recorded in the brain with behavioral variables. The data from this vast literature seem to confirm the initial intuitions about the role of mirror neurons in social behavior. Human brain areas with mirroring properties have been associated with imitation Iacoboni et al. Indeed, some studies show correlations between individual differences in empathy and activity in mirror neuron areas Pfeifer et al.
The more empathic the subject is, the higher the activity during imitation Pfeifer et al. Furthermore, patients who find social interactions difficult, such. These data support the idea that mirror neurons are important for the effortless, automatic understanding of the mental states of other people Iacoboni, , and may also be the basis of automatic imitation Cross and Iacoboni, If we have a mechanism in the brain that automatically activates our own motor system when we see others performing actions, we should also have a control mechanism to avoid continuous automatic imitation.
Indeed, while humans tend to imitate others automatically and subconsciously, they tend to do that in a subtle way, imitating postures or the onset of movements when I reach for the glass you may reach for the napkin , without overtly parroting the behavior of other people. Our behavior would be highly dysfunctional if we were imitating each other all the time.
For instance, even during conversation humans tend to imitate each other, often using the same grammatical structures or noun selection if we are talking about furniture in the living room and I say sofa, it is highly unlikely that the person talking to me will use a synonym like couch; that person most likely will also use the word sofa Garrod and Pickering, ; Pickering and Garrod, However, we do not repeat word for word what the other person has just told us.
What are the mechanisms and neural systems for control of mirroring? The evidence, albeit not conclusive yet, points to a number of potential mechanisms for control of mirroring. Neurological patients with prefrontal lesions show imitative behavior, the rather dysfunctional tendency to imitate whatever other people do in front of them. The lesions that produce this rare behavior are very large, suggesting that multiple brain centers may be involved in mirroring control Lhermitte et al. Some imaging studies indeed suggest that multiple brain areas in the frontal lobe may implement some type of control of mirroring Brass et al.
The differential role of these areas is unclear. Finally, other imaging data suggest that in some situations control is implemented by reconfiguring the connectivity among many different brain systems important for sensory-motor behavior Cross and Iacoboni, The study of the mechanisms of control of mirroring is potentially extremely important. If we can understand how the brain implements control of mirroring, we can in principle intervene and modulate its activity. In some cases, as in the case of autism, it may be beneficial to reduce control and increase mirroring.
In some other cases, as in the case of individuals exposed to violent behavior who may be involved in spreading contagion of violence, it may be beneficial to increase control of mirroring, thus reducing. Mirror neurons provide an important missing link between the social science data on contagion of violence and the model that draws similarities between contagious mechanisms in infectious diseases and contagion of violence.
They provide a neurobiologically grounded mechanism that is fairly automatic and reflexive albeit not entirely reflexive, of course. It is important to pay attention to the neuroscience data because they suggest forms of human automatic behavior that require careful consideration when planning interventions and policy that attempt to reduce contagion of violence.
Eleanor Taylor-Nicholson, L. Among justice system officials and the citizenry at large, one of the most accepted methods for dealing with individual and community violence is punishment of offenders through incarceration. The United States has the largest imprisonment rate of any nation. As of the end of , 2. The majority of violent offenders are sentenced to prison BJS, Besides these adults, more than 75, juveniles were held in juvenile incarceration facilities or adult institutions. The role of prisons in responding to violent crime has grown considerably.
In , the number of offenders sentenced to state prison for violent offenses reached ,, up from 95, violent offenders in This increase accounted for 60 percent of prison growth during this period BJS, Little is understood, however, about whether prisons really work to reduce or prevent the spread of violence in society.
Many people assume that prison prevents violence, at least temporarily, by keeping violent individuals off the street. But what if imprisonment makes matters worse and increases transmission? Few longitudinal studies have examined the effects. We do know that recidivism is high among former inmates, and we also have some limited indication from studies of prison life about the levels and types of violence among prisoners and former inmates.
It is striking that this literature may suggest that incarceration could in fact exacerbate violence in some cases, both within the prison walls and in the broader community. This raises significant questions about the dominant ideology that determines how governments invest in strategies to reduce violence. He never said who did it, but we all knew.
Things went on like that for awhile. Every so often; Andy would show up with fresh bruises. One big concern about addressing violence through incarceration is that prisons themselves are extremely violent places. While this has long been recognized, quantitative studies only began in the s Ellis et al. Nancy Wolff and Jing Shi, for example, have conducted research in prisons across a northeastern state of the United States to determine frequency of victimization of physical and sexual violence.
They defined physical violence in line with the National Violence Against Women and Men surveys to include being hit, slapped, kicked, bit, choked, beat up, or hit with or threatened with a weapon. Of the 20, inmates at 14 facilities 13 for males and one for females surveyed, Wolff and Shi found that approximately 20 percent of female inmates and 25 percent of male inmates reported being physically assaulted during their current sentence by either another inmate or a guard. In the previous 6 months before the survey, men reported much higher incidence of assault with a weapon than women, and also reported much higher victimization by a staff member; nearly one in four men was assaulted by a staff member in the 6-month period.
Not all prisoners are violent, and not all inmates are victimized. On average, victims in the Wolff and Shi study were in their early 30s, African American, had spent at least 2 years in the facility, had 4 to 5 years remaining to serve, and had spent 8 years in prison since turning 18 Wolff and Shi, Victimization was noted to depend on age and vulnerability. Younger inmates were more likely to be targeted either by other inmates. Juvenile facilities are not immune from these challenges.
Mendel conducted an analysis of the court-sanctioned remedies ordered to address violent or abusive conditions in juvenile facilities, as well as of reports written by reputable media outlets. The Annie E. The findings are as follows: since , 39 states; since , 32 states, and since , 22 states. The causes of violent behavior are rarely treated effectively in prisons. A number of researchers have argued, for example, that prison violence may often be related to untreated mental illness.
Emotionally disturbed inmates or inmates who require mental health services have been found to commit prison infractions disproportionately compared to other inmates. Because the correlation between prison infractions and violence is often high, these inmates are disproportionately involved in violent incidents as well James and Glaze, Preexisting mental illness is not limited to adult inmates.
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In one early study of juveniles, 85 boys detained in California for mostly violent offenses were given a standard psychiatric screen, a semi-structured interview for posttraumatic stress disorder PTSD , and self-report questionnaires measuring personality traits and defenses. A sex- and age-matched group was. The results indicated that 32 percent of the inmates fulfilled criteria for PTSD, and 20 percent partial criteria.
Half of the subjects said witnessing of interpersonal violence was the traumatizing event Steiner et al. Incarceration may in some cases exacerbate mental illness or emotional frailty of inmates. Craig Haney, also one of the researchers in the Zimbardo experiment, has subsequently written further about the psychological impact of incarceration Haney, , and identified the following common symptoms among his clients:.
Importantly, Haney notes that these effects vary from individual to individual, and may not necessarily be permanent. This echoes another considerable body of research that has explored the ways different prisoners adjust to life in prison and noted that some prisoners even improve functioning Bukstel and Kilman, A Canadian study found that some prisoners saw being in prison as a chance to turn their lives around, and many inmates, while resenting imprisonment, expected their lives to improve after release Zamble and Porprino, There is little research on the attributes of prisons that are helpful or hurtful in terms of postrelease adjustment.
An assumption has been that smaller prisons, which have more education and treatment services and less restrictive custody situations, are less criminogenic, but the research on these issues still needs to be conducted. Of all those incarcerated in U. However, recidivism rates are high. One study found that within 3 years, 67 percent of returning prisoners were rearrested for a serious offense and 52 percent were returned to prison for a new criminal offense Langan and Levin, These rates are highest for nonviolent criminals robbery, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft , but violent criminals also recidivate.
Overall, s. Some evidence has also emerged of high levels of family violence among current and recently released inmates. White et al. Other studies have found that domestic violence perpetrated by recently released inmates was related to frustration at joblessness, changed relationship circumstances, and displaced anger at incarceration Oliver and Hairston, Although there is good reason to assume that sources of violence transmission spread violence among prisoners, family members, the children of prisons, and in the communities where released inmates return, the research on this key topic is underdeveloped.
What longitudinal studies are available rarely employ the experience of incarceration as an independent variable. Report on the Commission … Op. International Trotskyism , , Duke U. The Origins … Op. Leeds Univ. S un Yat-sen returned to China from Japan in determined to lead the struggle for reunification but with a military not a political perspective. By he had established himself as a leading member of a regional military government based in the city of Canton in South China.
Sun was convinced that unifying China required military conquest. This would start in the south but to gain control of Beijing required the overthrow of the northern warlords. On 13 January , some 30, Hong Kong seamen struck for union recognition and a pay increase to bring their pay more into line with that of Europeans. The Hong Kong seamen held out for eight weeks in a bitter and bloody struggle. The crews of the Yangtse steamers went on strike soon afterwards for two weeks and also won victory.
The CCP participated in, and actively aided, the strike and this raised its prestige enormously but the strike demonstrated that the CCP was not yet in the same league as the KMT even within unionised labour. This was certainly not true at the top of the KMT but Maring believed that the loose structure of the KMT made it easy for the CCP to enter the KMT, convince its left wing of the need for mass action in support of the nationalist struggle, win a majority and change the composition of the KMT.
The discussions within the CCP were over whether, if it entered the KMT, it could maintain its own identity and establish its own independent activity amongst the workers.
Furthermore, we must maintain our complete independence in any arrangement we may make in a United Front. He would receive short shrift at the 4th World Congress where he would be accused of ultra-leftism. They all refused. The Western powers were too attached to their special privileges to support a united independent China. At this critical moment Voitinsky visited Sun. This soon became the most important undertaking of the Party. In May , on the back of the Hong Kong strike, it organised the First National Labour Conference in Canton which was attended by delegates claiming to represent , union members.
Present were nine delegates representing about members. The British Labour Party was an organisation of the bourgeoisie which existed to systematically dupe the workers. However, prior to the 2nd Congress of the CCP, Maring had attended the ECCI meeting of 17 July and presented a report describing the KMT as a national-revolutionary movement; a bloc of intellectuals, liberal democratic bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and workers.
Adolph Joffe, later to be a leading Left Oppositionist, was in China heading a Soviet diplomatic mission. After meeting Sun Yat-sen he wrote to Moscow in July The CC argued that any alliance with the KMT should be temporary, based on specific issues, and include the continuing independence of the two parties.
The discussions between Chen, Maring, and the KMT took place between the 3rd and 4th World Congresses, both of which were concerned with advancing the United Front strategy. Thus, the discussions within the CCP were couched in terms of a United Front, but that was not what was being proposed for China. A United Front was a temporary alliance between independent parties for specific goals, but here was a strategy in which CCP members entered the KMT and worked within it subject to KMT discipline for an unspecified period to achieve goals set by the KMT.
The CCP both formally and informally was being tied into relationships with members of the KMT and tempted to make all kinds of concessions to be accepted and, possibly worse of all, the major work being undertaken by many if not most CCP members was to build KMT branches, often from scratch. Maring met Sun on 25 August in the French concession in Shanghai and the terms of the collaboration were endorsed, i. Soviet military and financial assistance would begin arriving the following summer. The plans for a new programme and constitution had been drawn up by a committee headed by Maring and Chen Duxiu.
The CI gave its support to any genuinely revolutionary national movement against imperialism in the colonial and semi-colonial countries; but before joint actions the Communist Party had to establish itself as an independent factor and only after its complete political autonomy had been secured could it make temporary agreements with revolutionary bourgeois democratic forces. The theses were at pains to point out that in the so-called backward countries, the struggle for the land was a key element in the revolutionary national liberation struggle against imperialism.
At the 4th World Congress, the machinery of the centre was considerably strengthened with an enlarged ECCI scheduled to meet once every four months with a Presidium, on the pattern of the Russian Politburo. The text of the resolution referred to the KMT as a party only in quotation marks and in this way the document avoided having to define the class nature of the KMT as bourgeois. The policy Zinoviev was proposing for China reflected the class-collaboration he had shown in October The resolution re-affirmed the central task for China as the national revolution against imperialism, repeating that the KMT was the only serious national revolutionary group so the activities of the KMT and CCP should be co-ordinated.
The CCP was instructed to work independently and openly to create trade unions and lay the foundations for a strong mass Communist Party, but how it could do so while its members were limited by KMT discipline was not described.
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Implicit in the ECCI resolution was the assumption that the Chinese national revolution would be a self-contained stage in which the national bourgeoisie remained steadfastly anti-imperialist with the CCP playing a supportive role. Ignored was the possibility that the bourgeoisie might have stronger links with the imperialists than the proletariat and peasantry, and align themselves accordingly. In the event, the Chinese national democratic revolution — just as in Russia in — would have to be carried though against the national bourgeoisie.
The CCP would have to choose capitulation or conflict. Pressure from the ECCI ensured it furled its banner. During strikes took place on all the trunk lines with CCP members playing a leading role. On 7 February, the warlord Wu Pei-fu ordered his troops onto the railway stations in Hankou part of the Wuhan complex where they opened fire on the strikers. Sixty railwaymen were killed and the strike collapsed. This became known as the February 7th Massacre.
With the defeat of the strike there was widespread persecution of militants but trade union organisation recovered surprisingly rapidly, and by the number of unionised workers had reached ,, and a year later had risen to 1,, Mao was an active and able leader. In response to the February 7th Massacre, the Hunan branch of the CCP organised demonstrations, memorial meetings, even an attempt to get the local railroad workers to strike in sympathy. In March, in protest at Japanese territorial demands, the branch organised a protest demonstration of some 60, people.
The main body of the revolutionary democratic faction is, of course, the Kuomintang; the rising Communist faction is co-operating with it. Everyone must be aware of this. This would supposedly rally the forces of the working class and enable the CCP to grow into a mass party of the proletariat while it remained within the KMT! In this directive the ECCI, for the first time, publicly recognised that the success of the national bourgeois democratic revolution depended on the millions of small peasants. It proposed that the CCP urge the KMT to adopt a programme the most important demand of which was seizure of large private estates and church and monastery lands, and their distribution to the peasantry.
This minor concession which made little difference to the lives of the peasants was praised to the skies by Borodin and used as a fig leaf to hide his failure. It would be wrong to draw too close a parallel between Russia and China, but the Revolution in Russia had demonstrated clearly that peasants do not limit their demands to those acceptable to the landlords.
The different sectors of the bourgeoisie; comprador, banker, factory owner and, especially, the families of army officers all had large holdings in the rural areas. The CCP was allied with a bourgeois party and if its demands undermined the economic and social position of the entire bourgeois class the KMT would inevitably break that alliance. At the 3rd National Congress of the CCP June , there was considerable opposition amongst the 40 delegates representing members of whom only 19 were female and over were in prison to the bloc within.
Two reasons predominated. Secondly, CCP members were having to spend considerable valuable time and effort setting up KMT branches before they could join them. The qualitative difference from the first manifesto is obvious. Within the Party, Mao was second only to Chen. An important passage reads:. Due to historical inevitability and current circumstances, the role of merchants in national revolution is more urgent and important than that of others. As we know, semi-colonial China is under the dual political pressure of warlords and foreign imperialists who colluded with each other to suppress the people of the whole nation.
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Mao now used his position on the CB to actively promote the formation of KMT branches by CCP members, particularly in Hunan, and in mid-September , he returned to Changsha to help in successfully establishing a KMT branch with three local cells, and by January claimed a membership of nearly , only the branches in Canton and Shanghai were bigger. Maring returned to Moscow and was replaced by Mikhail Borodin who arrived in China in September Both were fluent in English and so needed no interpreters and this helped in forming a close personal bond between the two men.
The entire Congress was stage-managed by Borodin: he convened it, wrote the major documents, ensured Sun was elected leader for life, had the Congress agree formally to take Communists into the party as individuals who must abide by the rules of the KMT , and arranged for three Communists to be elected as full members and seven as alternate members to the strong CEC. But behind the scenes the conservative elements within the KMT were coalescing and increasing their power. To protect their interests, landlords and factory owners raised the demand that KMT members limit their work to purely nationalist goals, i.
To present his strategy in the best light, Borodin arbitrarily divided the KMT into a left and a right on the basis of those who approved the entry of the CCP. This, of course, presented a picture of an overwhelmingly left party with a few dissident right wingers. The class basis of the different groupings was deliberately ignored to better disguise the bourgeois nature of the KMT.
Within the KMT, the CCP members openly organised themselves into fractions, and were acknowledged to be the most energetic party workers and organisers. Even Li Lisan who had been a key and major figure in building the trade unions was re-assigned to help reorganise the KMT. Sun Yat-sen was of the opinion:. For the moment, the Communists took as much advantage as possible of their opportunities and continued to organise the proletariat but as the process of reorganising and restructuring the KMT advanced, the CCP found itself more and more constrained by the bloc within.
However, in no-one could have foreseen that the emergence of Stalin as leader would mean the CCP would be ordered to cling to the KMT until hacked away by the swords of NRA officers. From , the ECCI was empowered to issue directions to national sections that were binding, and to annul resolutions passed at national congresses with which it disagreed. Peng Shuzhi had spent some time in Moscow as a student and then lecturer. He returned with a number of others in August to help remedy the shortage of trained CCP personnel. This second wave of Bolshevisation was generally welcomed because it was accepted by the CCP that it needed trained and experienced cadres.
However, the contradictions arising due to the fundamental class nature of the KMT abounded and fuelled antagonisms towards the CCP so much so that in , leading members of the CC were again pressing for the CCP to end the bloc within. Peng Shuzhi in December published an article in the party theoretical journal New Youth , of which he had become the editor, emphasising the need for the proletariat to take the lead in the Chinese national revolution.
KMT militants including CCP members seized a boatload of arms intended for the Volunteers and on 26 August in a short, sharp engagement, defeated and disarmed them. A few months later in February , a local warlord threatened Canton but joint action by KMT forces and peasant militias forced him back. The working class was recovering from the May 7th Massacre of the previous year and strike activity was increasing, particularly in Canton and Shanghai. CCP and KMT militants often worked together to build trade unions, and between May and May , union membership rose from , to ,, and by May , was over a million.
At the same Congress, the CCP then numbering just under 1, on the basis of the rising class struggle, relaxed its membership conditions and attempted to begin the move towards a mass proletarian party rather than remain a mainly intellectual group — within eighteen months the membership would double.
Under pressure of work Mao fell ill, was given sick leave just two weeks before the 4th Congress, and was not re-elected to the Central Committee. Sun died suddenly in March With his death the social tensions within the KMT, which he had kept under control, came into the open. In , workers in enterprises all across Shanghai were striking sporadically against appalling working conditions and low wages and on May Day , the 2nd National Labour Conference opened in Canton with delegates representing over half a million union members. On 28 May, the CCP called for co-ordinated protest demonstrations and on 30 May , thousands of workers and students marched in protest and several were arrested.
The march went straight to the police station to demand the release of their comrades. There, a British officer ordered the police under his command to open fire, killing nine people and wounding dozens. This May 30th Incident triggered an unprecedented eruption of the working class, more than separate strikes involving , workers arose directly out of the shootings and culminated in a general strike across Shanghai.
At this time, the CCP branch in Shanghai was led by Chen and Peng and remained sufficiently independent to severely criticise the attempts by the local KMT to compromise with the factory owners. Between the end of May and the middle of September, the class-forces that would struggle for mastery during the coming revolution differentiated themselves. Initially, all the urban classes seemed to support the strike and merchants and businessmen joined the protests.
But the workers predominated, the Chinese proletariat was the leading component of the struggle right from its start and, as the strike developed, the necessity of a proletarian party which retained its political and organisational independence was confirmed with startling clarity. The foreign capitalists who owned the electrical power stations retaliated by shutting off the power to Chinese factories.
The Chinese bourgeoisie who had never been very ardent, unable to operate their factories and seeing the growing radicalism of the working class, rapidly ceased to support the strike and began secretly co-operating with the imperialists against the strike movement — a characteristic of the bourgeoisie ever since the revolution of when the German bourgeoisie had been prepared, even eager, to compromise with the aristocracy. During July and August , the petty-bourgeoisie and those with an intermediate position in society began to vacillate. A week later, during a demonstration in Canton, over 50 students and workers were killed by Anglo-French military police.
A general strike and boycott of British goods followed immediately, and all foreign industrial activity ground to a halt. The movement was well organised through a member Canton-Hong Kong Strike Committee, responsible to a delegate conference which had one representative for every 50 strikers and met twice a week. They organised patrols of pickets many of these patrols were peasants along the entire frontier of Kwangsi province to keep out British ships and British goods from Hong-Kong.
The Canton-Hong Kong strike lasted for fifteen months and remains one of the greatest strikes in history. It was anti-imperialist in its demands, proletarian in its methods. It raised the question of who would hold state power if the workers and peasants, guns in hand, seized governmental power — would they voluntarily hold back or would they flood over the limits set by the bourgeoisie? The main leaders of this tremendous revolutionary movement were Communists. From being a party composed largely of students and intellectuals, the CCP increased its membership ten-fold and of these between half and two-thirds were workers.
The CCP moved from being a few intellectuals to a party rooted in the working class, with mass support. During the strike the CCP targeted agitation at specific sections of the population especially women and youth, and helped set up peasant unions in alliance with the urban workers. The CCP was still small numerically compared to the KMT but its leadership of large-scale proletarian actions posed the question of how long it could continue to subordinate itself to the discipline of the bourgeois party.
The radicalism sweeping China had also greatly benefitted the KMT and within two years it had grown into a mass force in many areas due to the work of Communists ; and simultaneously it had been transformed from a loose association into a structured party with an effective army. The KMT now set its eyes on Beijing. But, just as the SRs in , they vacuously promised the land would be redistributed lawfully in due course, insisting the peasants took no action to seize the land.
However, the formation of even reformist peasant leagues caused dissatisfaction among the rightist elements in the KMT. The heart of the KMT the families of the army officers were landlords who brooked no challenge to their control over the land. If the Communists supported peasant demands for seizure of the land then that would place the CCP and the KMT on opposite sides of the barricades; the former with the oppressed and the latter with the landlords and imperialists.
The revolution was entering a new phase; the right wing was organising to oppose strike action by workers, oppose organisation of the peasants into peasant leagues and oppose the right of Communists to be in the KMT. His position was rejected by the Comintern representative, Voitinsky, who won the support of a majority of the Central Committee on the grounds that such a policy would lead to exclusion from the KMT at a time when the benefits of the bloc within were about to be reaped.
To many in the CCP it must have sounded wonderful. Voitinsky also pointed out that the bloc within had assisted the CCP to grow enormously and rapidly. By November it claimed 10, members and this would triple in the next six months. However, Voitinsky played down the response of the bourgeoisie to the Shanghai strike and the demands for the expulsion of Communists from the KMT.
He closed his eyes to the very sharp differences regarding the policy of land distribution that were exposed during the initial stages of work amongst the peasants; that the peasants were demanding the land but the social composition of the KMT made it impossible for it to carry out land redistribution. He closed his eyes to the fact that sooner or later the CCP would have to choose between supporting the starving Chinese peasantry or the bourgeois KMT. The theoretical justification for the bloc within and its continuation was provided by Bukharin, who argued that the Chinese national bourgeoisie would play an objectively revolutionary role in the bourgeois revolution against feudalism and imperialism ignoring the Russian example which demonstrated just the opposite.
He presented the KMT not as a bourgeois party but as a neutral academic arena which could objectively discuss and, by a majority vote, determine the best way forward for the national revolution. Even at the strictly organisational level this was untrue — the ECCI including Bukharin had only recently provided the model and means for reorganising the KMT into a tightly disciplined organisation controlled from the top down, which effectively blocked such a transformation. It was inevitable that in the end the Chinese bourgeoisie would join with imperialists and militarists to crush the revolution.
This was trumpeted within the CCP as demonstrating the success of the bloc within. The following month at the 6th Plenum of the ECCI, Tan Pingshan, the chief Chinese delegate, claimed that the left and Communists had out of the total of votes and that the Congress had adopted many of the Communist demands for social reforms to the benefit of workers and peasants. This was just what the ECCI wanted to hear and its members took the report as verification of its strategy. But this parody of an association meant the ECCI was even more opposed to any suggestion that the CCP leave the bloc within, and it urged the CCP to avoid engaging in class battles in which they would be opposed to the patriotic bourgeoisie of the KMT.
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The workers were mobilised, and Communists occupied leading positions in a nationwide movement, launching a number of large strikes and giant demonstrations. The coming months would see the working class engaged in several victorious armed revolts as when the worker masses in Hangkow and Chiuchiang seized the British settlements, and in Shanghai where they occupied the entire city with the exception of the foreign concessions.
While the young CCP was weak and composed almost entirely of intellectuals, and while the KMT had the support of large numbers of workers the bloc within was an acceptable tactic. Indeed the entry tactic if treated as an episode on the road to an independent party could have been a magnificent success. Unfortunately, its ongoing application in a distorted form in completely changed conditions would prove disastrous for the Chinese Revolution. In China the revolution was on the rise and bureaucratic calculations of who would be voted onto what committee and which resolution would be passed by the KMT Congress were worthless in the face of class war.
It would not be the Communists and the left who would eject the right from the KMT, but the right and left of the KMT who would eject and massacre the Communists. Documents on the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution. The China Quarterly, , No. Henk Sneevliet papers, socialhistory. Before Mao, Collins, , p Harvard U. Communist International, , Faber and Faber, Ltd. The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, w. The World Revolution , w. Chen Duxiu and the Fourth International , Rev.
Vol 2 No 4 The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution , Curtzon. As practice proved the new line disastrously wrong, factional interests within the Russian Party became the determining factor and guidance gave way to direct orders. If challenged, the representatives of the CI threatened individuals and even the entire organisation with expulsion from the CI to force acceptance of their proposals. Such actions were quite compatible with the methods used by the Stalin faction in Russia.
During the Great Purges, carried out to maintain the Stalin faction in power, more Russian Communists were killed than during the civil war. The results were major political and military defeats for the CCP, the loss of any significant proletarian support and a twenty year detour during which the Chinese people were subject to horrendous suffering. Knowledge of the development of the Stalin faction within the Bolshevik Party, and how its policies for the Chinese Revolution derived from its own needs not the reality of China, are essential for an understanding of the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution.
The former was intended to be the real leadership in the Party and because of its relatively small membership could decide all issues that mattered quickly and efficiently. The latter would allocate resources to carry out CC decisions. Before Stalin had played no direct role in leading the party machinery but from now on his attention was on party affairs, and via these three posts Stalin participated in making policy decisions, was responsible for allocating party resources to implement them, and then in charge of the Commissariat which assessed how well he had done.
By the 10th Congress March , Stalin was sufficiently powerful to have his supporters elected to the CC and its Secretariat in place of those friendly to Trotsky. The Orgburo was expanded to seven members to give Stalin an in-built majority. This included the selection and allocation of cadres to Party posts. There is no doubt that Stalin was able to point to a number of successes in streamlining Party organisation and making the Party more effective in carrying out Politburo and CC decisions. However, Stalin began to use the resources of the Party to strengthen a clique personally loyal to him.
This unprincipled grouping began as all such groups do, based on gossip and backstabbing, with the principal target Leon Trotsky. Prior to October , no leader within the Bolsheviks had ever suggested that after the revolution there would be a one-Party political system, and in the period immediately after the insurrection even the bourgeois Cadet Party remained legal. The only political organisation which was suppressed was the neo-fascist Black Hundreds, infamous for inciting pogroms.
But, contrary to expectations, the October Revolution had been a socialist revolution which meant that the urban middle class allies anticipated by Lenin in  now opposed the Bolshevik insurrection. The initial response, on 9 November , was a decree banning hostile newspapers, but the decree specifically stated that the ban was of a temporary nature, and would be rescinded as soon as normal conditions were re-established.
However, under the protection of the Whites who were resourced mainly by England and France, and no fewer than thirteen armies of intervention which included Americans, French, Czech, and Japanese, the Right Socialist Revolutionaries SRs and some Mensheviks, with support from Cadets were proclaiming their own governments in a number of places such as Archangel, Omsk, Samara, and Ufa. These people spoke in the name of democracy but, in fact, ceded real power to the counter-revolutionary armies. This made it impossible for these parties to have freedom of propaganda and agitation within Soviet-controlled areas.
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A sharp polarisation took place in the Soviets. Generally, by , at local level the Party branch secretary had replaced the chairperson of the Soviet as the leading official. The 12th All-Russian Party Conference August formalised the actual situation, and the resolution on The Registration of Associations and Unions meant the prohibition of all parties but the Bolsheviks. During the civil war the Bolsheviks were forced to adopt the policy of War Communism with intense centralisation and Party control of virtually every aspect of society, nationalisation of industries necessary to maintain supplies to the armies, and the removal of decision-making authority from state institutions and non-Party organisations.
War Communism included the forced requisitioning of grain. However, once the Whites were defeated and they considered their land safe, the mass of peasants vigorously resisted requisitioning which they viewed as theft by the state. The peasants responded by planting only what they needed for themselves. This meant there was little or no grain to requisition. On 1 March , the sailors at the giant Kronstadt naval base rose in revolt — a reflection that the relations between the Soviet state and the peasant masses had reached an all-time low.
However, War Communism had adverse long-term consequences: the replacement of internal Party democracy by top-down command, and the introduction of a system of appointment rather than election of local Party leaders. That these changes occurred in parallel with the banning of opposition parties meant War Communism brought into existence a hierarchical social system based on the Bolshevik Party which simultaneously became the gateway to a secure job. The NEP meant that the peasants paid a tax on what they produced and sold their surplus on the open market. This move to a market economy satisfied the immediate demands of the peasantry but represented a turn by the Communist Party to the middle peasants and kulaks who were the most efficient and biggest producers of foodstuffs.
With the adoption of the NEP by the Soviet regime, the process of equalisation of land-holdings that had taken place after October and intensified during War Communism was reversed. The NEP with its reliance on the market, strengthened the kulaks and NEPmen capitalist speculators to the detriment of the poor peasants and the proletariat. The kulaks had the largest and most fertile farms and the capital necessary for equipment, horses, and fertiliser; they made huge profits.
The NEP gave the Soviet regime the opportunity to catch its breath, but at the cost of increasing social differentiation. Production of goods and produce for a market economy led to the rapid enrichment not only of petty-bourgeois kulaks, shopkeepers and traders but also a number of sticky-fingered Party officials. Alongside the re-emergence of class divisions, the budding bureaucracies of the state, industry, and Party began to coalesce and flex their muscles. Material inequalities began to widen rapidly. In , the government ruled that the highest-paid managers should earn no more than four times the minimum wage.
With the advent of NEP that ratio was increased to eight times. A survey conducted in showed that more than 80, state officials admitted to earning more than the upper limit, 15, were on more than 15 times the minimum — to say nothing of corrupt and illegal earnings, which everyone believed were widespread. Private trade flourished but state enterprises were constrained by government policy to make good war damage while working without loss, and to fund any wage increases from higher productivity.
Women were particularly hard hit. A wave of strikes and disturbances swept the country sometimes led by stalwart Party members who, as active trade unionists, felt a responsibility to their workmates. The NEP generated a mood of personal aggrandisement, which often contaminated proletarian Party members returning home from the Red Army. Most of these would be given administrative jobs in the new state apparatus or factory management, cut off from the factory floors from which they had come.
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During this period, Party functionaries particularly the new influx, were finding their feet and beginning to forge relationships across and within government organisations, industrial management and the state apparatus. In part they were coalescing into an elite that would become the rulers of the Soviet Union. Over the period of the NEP, the majority of rank and file Party members went from supporting the actions of the factory workers in defence of wages and conditions to — under pressure from the local Party secretaries — siding with the factory managers against the workforce, supporting cuts in pay and working conditions and increased workloads.
In many cases this led to disillusion and demoralisation of the rank and file who quit the Party. Those who remained had to develop a tough skin — and all too often these were the most politically backward members. The continued failure of a revolution to take place in a technologically advanced country left Russia isolated and provided the conditions for the growth of both alien class forces and internal bureaucratic degeneration.
The membership of the Bolshevik Party had been overwhelmingly proletarian in October and the early days of the civil war when capture by the Whites meant a certain and cruel death. During this period there was an open door policy towards recruitment. However, at the 8th Party Congress it was recognised that many of the enthusiasts who had joined did not have the necessary integrity, honesty, commitment or political understanding.
However, by the autumn of the situation had changed again and the regime had its back to the wall, threatened by a ring of White armies. In such a situation the doors were again thrown open and between October and December nearly , new recruits entered the Party. By the 9th Congress in March , the membership was over ,, and by the 10th Congress in March , almost three-quarters of a million. The new members were in their vast majority honest Communists, prepared to risk life and limb for the revolution, but their political education was more military manual than Marxist text.
In the civil war the resolution and solution of problems had to be immediate, with centralisation of decision-making and a non-elected command structure.
Savage Innocence by Anne Mather
The very purpose of the Red Army and the central role of the Party within it had enhanced the fusion of state and Party and increased centralisation of decision making within the Party itself. The need for Communists in senior positions in government and industry meant that on demobilisation, a large proportion of Party members were directly appointed to administrative posts.
Pirani gives figures for the latter half of when in Moscow alone nearly 2, Party members were appointed to local and central state bodies. It had the power to order members to change their occupation and place of residence at short notice, and this was used not only for promotion but also for maintaining discipline: a shift from the capital to the wilderness of Siberia could be the punishment for voicing dissent. After the civil war a Party card was almost a guarantee of a secure job, and careerists flooded in. Despite this, one estimate had former Mensheviks and SRs comprising about one quarter of the active higher cadres by One cannot properly understand the policies pursued by Lenin, and supported by Trotsky, in this period without remembering the actual situation in Russia: hunger, partial atomisation of the proletariat, economic catastrophe, very low cultural and technological levels of the population, and pressures from the petty-bourgeois peasant masses which had doubled due to the NEP — all consequences of the delay of the international revolution.
In the face of such stresses how was the Soviet state to be maintained? Lenin was convinced that class enemies who had entered the Party were consciously using the differences raised by genuine Bolsheviks e. Hence, the 10th Party Congress in early — with the Kronstadt revolt taking place almost at its door — banned factions within the Party.
Lenin made it clear that this was a temporary measure brought in to deal with an exceptional situation and, moreover, favoured a flexible interpretation of this rule, rejecting attempts to make it definitive. This emergency measure which circumscribed the democratic rights of Party members strengthened the bureaucratic tendencies within the Party. The Party had leapt from the underground to the heights of power and as times changed so too did people. More and more, Stalin was using his increasing domination of the Party organisation to recruit to important posts, people who were personally obligated and loyal to him.
In his position of General Secretary as he dispensed favours and fortune, he was losing his moral integrity. The foundations were being laid for an inevitable conflict with Bolshevism. With the ban on internal factions, power within the Party became progressively centralised in the Politburo and CC. This centralisation inevitably had its organisational form: the Secretariat under Stalin increasingly supervised i.
As Kremlin files have become public, much attention has been concentrated on the details of the growth of a centralised system of Party functionaries effectively appointed by, and beholden to, the General Secretary. The wealth of detail now available only confirms the essential analysis made at the time by opposition currents within the RCP. The major difference is that the bureaucracy proved more servile and self-seeking than the Oppositionists ever dreamed. By the time of the 9th Party Congress of September , the appointment of secretaries of provincial committees was well established, though at that time, local recommendations for the posts were still preferred.
We were at a loss to find a remedy for this bureaucratization. Most leading members of the Stalin group were Old Bolsheviks with numerous personal links going back, in many cases, to before They were efficient capable organisers, hard-working, often patient and prudent, creatures of the apparatus and well aware of their own importance.
They shared a common conservative outlook. Stalin, as General Secretary, embodied this new group, united them and brought them together. It was around him that they formed a growing freemasonry. Publicly Stalin called for the free election of regional and provincial Party leaders but behind the scenes he was busy ensuring the domination of the centre and appointment from above. Any remaining element of internal democracy in the Party was strangled when the Secretariat appointed unelected provincial bureaux to oversee the work of the elected committees.
These bodies, initially composed of independently-minded Party members, could act to protect the rank and file from overbearing and bureaucratic officials. At the 11th Party Congress, however, it was agreed that the Central Control Commission should play a much greater role in guiding the work of local Commissions. Of course, a majority of the seven members elected to the Central Control Commission were strong supporters of Stalin.
In this way the Control Commission was made a parallel mechanism to the Party secretaries for control of the members. The function of the Commission was turned on its head; from defending the rights of the membership it became a mechanism for tighter control. The dissatisfaction with Old Bolsheviks was precisely because of their independence of mind which inevitably brought them into conflict with the practices of the Stalin faction. In , some tens of thousands of Bolshevik Party members were attempting to bring order to Soviet society.
Grossly overworked and with few, if any, material privileges, these Party officials were trying to lay the foundations of Soviet rule. Serge, who was one of these, described the situation:. All this while we were looking after considerable stocks and even riches. After , one-Party rule was assured, and these same Party members together with specialists inherited from the Tsarist regime industrial managers and technical intelligentsia , now directed the administrative machinery of both state and industry.
As this layer exercised its authority it began to accumulate material benefits, first surreptitiously and then legitimised by the Party. As Lenin talked of the proletarian nature of the Bolshevik Party being determined by the thin layer forming the Old Guard,  he was agreeing to take a step that would later be corrupted and used to legitimise material privileges in a way that broke with Bolshevik tradition and advanced the development of the bureaucratic elite. The conference, many of whose delegates would have qualified for the benefits, enthusiastically endorsed the proposals and then called on the CC to work out a similar system for Party officials in rural sub-districts who had not been included.
Before the 12th Conference there was a strong material dis-incentive preventing factory managers from joining the Communist Party, but afterwards membership of the Communist Party provided substantial additional benefits. Carr considered the data for industrial managers who gave their background as non-worker, finding two trends: that the number of such managers almost doubled between and , and the proportion of such managers who joined the Communist Party increased seven-fold. It is no surprise that at this time there was the gradual abolition of all those activities in and around the Party where free discussion on political matters took place.
The first to go were the Party discussion clubs and study circles but later all free discussion, even pre-Congress, would be discouraged and then disappear. The Party press had to be tightly controlled, Pravda and Izvestia , became a means of hiding the very sharp struggles taking place inside the Central Committee and the Politburo. The CC soon extended such control nationally and after regularly sent instructions to local newspaper editors about what should and what could not be published. The period before and immediately after the 1st Congress of the Communist International was hugely optimistic.
But the revolutionary wave was beaten back. The most decisive defeats were in Germany and Hungary. The result was a catastrophe, right-wing army units ran riot, killing hundreds of working class militants including Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebnicht. These events strengthened every conservative and inward-looking trend in the Soviet Union.
By , the situation in Germany was again rapidly approaching revolution due largely to the total collapse of the Deutchmark. In a barrow load of notes was needed to buy a cup of coffee with the resulting pauperisation of the working class and the ruin of the petty-bourgeoisie but with the export industries making fabulous profits. The trade union apparatus collapsed, belief in the parliamentary system evaporated, mass strikes led by factory committees erupted throughout the country, support for the KPD grew at an enormous rate — particularly amongst factory workers — largely because the Party had adopted a united front strategy.
The ECCI assessed the situation as rapidly heading towards a revolution and approved an overly complex plan for the revolutionary seizure of power. In many factories the KPD military organisation, the M-Apparat, began openly organising armed defence squads known as the Proletarian Hundreds. The central government moved quickly to demand they surrender their arms within three days. The ultimatum was ignored. On 21 October troops entered Saxony.
In Saxony the left SD government refused to back armed resistance and rather than call for a general strike, abandoned office. Invited to sit on the platform was SD Minister of Labour Georg Graupe who, when time came to vote for the strike, opposed the proposal on the grounds that it was unconstitutional! A poorly supported general strike simply petered out, the KPD leaders abandoned the plans for an insurrection, and the German October ended not with a bang but a hic-cup. The consequences had a much bigger impact on the political situation in Russia than in Germany.
During the summer and early autumn of , an internationalist, revolutionary fervour had shaken the Party. Meetings, banners and articles celebrated the approach of the German October and the end of the isolation of the Soviet Union. The younger generation responded with revolutionary enthusiasm and under their stimulus the Party temporarily revived. But the shock of the defeat of the German Revolution without a struggle and the disillusion it provoked, reverberated through the discussions in the Russian Party. The disillusionment, all the deeper because the Russian leaders had presented the victory of the revolution as guaranteed, was to weigh heavy on the morale and confidence of the Bolsheviks, strengthening the isolationist and inward-looking tendencies, to the great benefit of Stalin.
In April-May , Pravda published a series of seven lectures by Stalin entitled Foundations of Leninism which accurately expressed traditional Bolshevik policy:. The lectures were published as a booklet, but a few weeks later in August , the booklet was withdrawn and in October a second edition was produced bearing the same title and date as the first but expressing the opposite view. After consolidating its power and leading the peasantry in its wake the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build a socialist society.
The TSOC is at the heart of Stalinism: it is the justification for the existence of the bureaucracy and its material benefits, it was a doctrine created in response to tiredness and disappointment. Stalin now stated that Russia by its own efforts, could achieve socialism because of its vast spaces, riches of raw materials and the advantages of a planned economy. Stalin had turned Lenin on his head but from now on oppositionists would be presented as lacking confidence in the Russian Revolution, as being faint-hearted and pessimistic.
The TSOC was to become the nationalist doctrine of the rising bureaucracy, a barrier against socialist internationalism and Marxism. It is amazing that Stalin was able to progress so far with such an obviously anti-Leninist policy before being challenged. He was eminently successful. The Conference literally howled down Opposition objections that the theory rested on an obvious misinterpretation of Lenin. With such a perspective it was just one step to seeing the national sections of the CI as bargaining chips to protect the USSR from imperialist attack.
Today, when we examine the theory of TSOC it is, at first sight, difficult to understand how so many hundreds of thousands of honest communists in the international movement could accept such damaging and reactionary nonsense. Mao adhered so strongly to the policy of peaceful co-existence that in February , Nixon, the most despised of all American presidents, was invited to Beijing after which he felt able to take a much stronger line against the Vietnamese war of independence, bombing rail links with China.
The founders of the Bolshevik regime accepted that post-revolutionary society would need a professional bureaucracy, but only for a limited time. It was expected to decline in importance and soon die away. After the defeat of the counter-revolutionary forces, society would have no need for internal state violence. The level of bureaucracy was increasing, material inequalities between citizens were becoming greater not less, repression by the state instead of dying away was increasing by leaps and bounds, real democratic rights were withering not growing; the regime appeared to be heading in exactly the opposite direction to socialism.
The goals of the October Revolution had been strongly egalitarian but the reality of Soviet society was a new privileged layer and increasing social stratification and differentiation, creating conflicting social interests. The Russian bureaucracy was built on a pyramid of privileges and thus Stalin was consistently hostile to egalitarian ideas. On 5 January , the CC announced an increase in wage differentials and Pravda led a press campaign against egalitarianism. In this way they hoped to gain support amongst the more skilled and better paid workers for the system of pay differentials and privileges of which they were the main beneficiaries.
This opened the floodgates of privilege. In all major countries in women not only lacked the vote but were enmeshed in a thick web of discriminatory laws and sexist oppression. The Soviet government of October took swift action: women in Soviet Russia achieved full legal and political rights, including the right to hold property, act as head of the household, leave the marital home and obtain a divorce on request. Soviet law guaranteed women equal pay for equal work, while also providing on-the-job protection for them. Other laws protected and assisted mothers and assured full rights for children born outside marriage.
Abortion became legal in For the first time women served as judges and were appointed to important positions in the state apparatus. However, a large proportion of the membership of Zhenotdel were Party members or the wives of Party members and this tended to make it a female auxiliary of the Party. With the rise of Stalinism, these moves were reversed. Marriage and family laws established by the October Revolution were rewritten. Now the Soviet regime made a sharp turn, becoming a wife and mother was the goal lauded by the state propaganda machine.
In , homosexuality was made a criminal offence, punishable with up to eight years of imprisonment. An energetic nationwide campaign was launched against sexual promiscuity, quick and easy marriage, and adultery. In , legal abortion was abolished, except where life or health were endangered or a serious disease might be inherited.
The massive industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture, launched in , brought millions of women into the workforce. Employment of women creates conditions for their liberation but it is not necessarily liberation itself. Because improving the lives of women workers was not a political priority for the Stalinist regime, it never really progressed beyond seeing it as an economic problem, a cost on production. Thus, the condition of the social dining halls e. A clear indication of the conservative attitudes of the bureaucracy and the reaction as regards the family reached its climax with the law of 8 July , which made divorce virtually impossible to obtain and which re-established the legal differences between a child born in wedlock and one born out of wedlock.
The latter could no longer claim the surname, the support or the inheritance of his or her father. Mao is credited with a number of original theoretical contributions to Marxism. However, careful study of his writings confirms the observation that Mao was a premeditated Stalinist and many of his so-called innovations were simply the conscious transfer to China of manoeuvres that Stalin had developed empirically in response to the need to protect the bureaucracy.
The Soviet state was becoming a mechanism for the protection of privilege while the ordinary citizen was overworked, under-fed and inadequately housed. The existence of a so-called socialist state which supervised its citizens so closely and was so clearly repressive had to be justified. Against the expectations of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Stalin declared the class struggle does not die away but becomes sharper in the period of transition to socialism. Later Mao would cite the danger of capitalist restoration i. In reality, the degree of repression and the strength of the police state reflected the fear of the bureaucracy of the working class and those remaining revolutionary Communists who might act as sparks in a political crisis.
Stalin prettified the bureaucratic regime by redefining socialism. Ignored was the horrendous state of poverty in which the ordinary Soviet citizen lived in order to pay for the Five-Year Plans. Ignored were the millions who had died of hunger due to mis-management, the breakneck speed of industrialisation and forced collectivisation. Ignored was the low level of productivity and technique relative to the capitalist countries the Soviet worker produced about one tenth as much as the American worker at this time , the means of distribution the gross social inequalities which existed and, most importantly, the lack of any genuine Soviet democracy.
Parallel concepts would underpin the CCP definition of Chinese socialism. The formula was intended to justify the existing inequalities in the USSR. In parallel, in the army, the hierarchy of officers was re-established, from lieutenant to marshal.